Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Assessment

Continue to improve the contractor evaluation processes and weapon program performance metrics to focus on schedules and performance against baselines to increase performance and cost-effectiveness.

Recompete the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract.

Continue to monitor the DSW program's new efficiency measure to determine if it provides insight into additional opportunities to further improve cost-effectiveness.

Continue to improve the responsiveness of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure by coordinating program activity with the Complex 2030 Strategy by developing and implementing transition planning that includes transfer of Pit Manufacturing and Pit Manufacturing Capability from the Pit Campaign to DSW.

Measure: Annual percentage of warheads in the stockpile that are safe, secure, reliable, and available to the President for deployment.

Explanation:

Measure: Annual percentage of items supporting the enduring stockpile maintenance completed (and annual percentage of prior year non-completed maintenance items completed)

Explanation:

Measure: Cumulative percentage of progress in completing Nuclear Weapons Council-approved W76-1 LEP activity.

Explanation:

Measure: Cumulative percentage of progress in completing Nuclear Weapons Council-approved B61-7/11 LEP activity.

Explanation:

Measure: Cumulative percent reduction in projected W76 warhead production costs per warhead from established validated baseline, as computed and reported annually by the W76 LEP Cost Control Board.

Explanation:

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The clear purpose of the Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Program is science-based stockpile stewardship -- to ensure that all nuclear warheads in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable, if needed. The DSW Program achieves this purpose by: (1) conducting scheduled warhead maintenance, (2) conducting tests to certify warhead reliability and to detect/predict potential warhead issues mainly from aging, (3) developing solutions to extend warhead life or to correct potential issues resulting in a First Production Unit (FPU), (4) refurbishing all warheads to install the life extension solution and other fixes, (5) dismantling warheads retired from the stockpile, and (6) developing advanced warhead concepts for the stockpile.

Evidence: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended); Public Law (PL) 106-65; Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM); & Requirements and Planning Document (RPD).

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?

Explanation: The DSW Program directly supports the Nation's nuclear weapons defense mission. Through the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) DSW Program is responsible for enhancing U.S. national security through the military application of nuclear technology. The FY1994 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the U.S. in nuclear weapons." The Act codifies the need to maintain the Nation's nuclear deterrent while addressing no underground testing with an aging work force and stockpile. The DSW Program addresses the specific need to certify to the President on an annual basis that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, reliable, and secure in the absence of underground nuclear testing.

Evidence: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended); Department of Defense (DoD) Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2001; NNSA Strategic Plan; & Production and Planning Directive (P&PD).

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The research, development, and production of nuclear warheads are the sole province of the federal government. By statute, the research, development, and production of nuclear warheads/bombs is a federal government role and responsibility. The DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the federal agency solely responsible for the research, development, and production of these warheads and their safety, security and reliability. Within NNSA Defense Programs, DSW is supported by: a select group of Campaigns to provide specialized capabilities, Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) to provide a robust infrastructure, and Secure Transportation Asset to provide secure movement; but their roles are to supplement, not duplicate, the DSW R&D and production functions. Specific reference to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 establishes the need for civilian control (versus military/DoD control) of the nuclear stockpile thereby eliminating a redundant or duplicative program in the Nation's public or private sector.

Evidence: The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended); NWSM; NNSA Strategic Plan; & Joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X (Refurbishment) Process.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The NNSA DSW elements are jointly planned with, and reviewed by, the DoD through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) process to assure that the program is efficiently and effectively meeting the needs of the Nation's nuclear deterrent policies and requirements. This process is focused on accountability and management of a large capital assets and strong R&D program to assure a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear stockpile to meet National Security policies and military requirements. The DSW Program is structured to effectively manage and leverage funding through decisions made at the NWC level, the weapon refurbishment Phase 6.x Process, and a streamlined warhead/bomb-specific budgeting-by-weapon process. To support management and accounting, budget categories were established by weapon type in FY 2005 and include sub-categories under the Stockpile Research and Development (R&D) and Management sub-programs to execute warhead/bomb Life Extension Programs (LEPs), warhead/bomb stockpile systems work, and retire weapons, provide stockpile services, and develop advanced concepts.

Evidence: Annual DSW Program and Implementation Plans; Quarterly Program Reviews (QPRs); Joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; LEP Project Plans; DOE Inspector General (IG) Audits; NWC deliberation minutes; & Project Officer's Group (POG) recommendations

Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?

Explanation: The NNSA PPBE Process and FYNSP properly allot funding resources to the specific program elements and M&O contractors, on both a multi-year and annual basis. Specific DSW elements are funded annually according to the needs that have been defined by NNSA and/or jointly identified and approved with the DoD to assure a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear weapon stockpile to meet National Security requirements. Annual budget decisions correlate these joint NNSA-DoD-NWC agreements with targeted resources. Implementation is done annually by Work Authorizations and Approved Funding Programs from the program to the M&O contractors and weapons complex documentation, such as the Production & Planning Directive (P&PD). The jointly agreed-upon Life Extension Programs (LEPs) are individually planned and executed. This directly supports the program's purpose.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; NNSA Budget/Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP); DSW Program & Implementation Plans; LEP Project Plans; & P&PD.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The DSW Program has a limited number of specific long-term measures to meaningfully assess progress in achieving the program purpose. They are: 1) annually, complete required assessment and reports to support Stockpile Certification to the President; 2) annually, complete 95% of all Production Control Document (PCD)-required stockpile maintenance activity and 100% all prior year's non-compliance evaluations; 3) complete the B61-7/11 LEP by FY 2009: 4) complete the W76-1 LEP by FY 2013; 5) complete the W80-3 LEP by FY 2015; 5) complete the W87 LEP by FY 2008; and 7) complete appropriately authorized Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) activities.

Evidence: NNSA Budget/FYNSP; DSW Program and Implementation Plans; Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs); RPD; & Program Control Documents (PCDs) for each warhead and bomb type/family.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The long-term measures cited above are ambitious, measurable, and have specific endpoints. Implementation of the NNSA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process has instituted requirements to identify the appropriate level of performance measures for DSW work that is coordinated through the Nuclear Weapons Council. The long-term measures are correlated with DSW ongoing and long-term efforts and associated timeframes that are extremely ambitious given the one-of-a-kind R&D that goes into nuclear weapons, the strict adherence to safety and security requirements, the commitment to forego underground nuclear testing, the aging of weapon systems and components beyond their design life, and the retiring of nuclear experts with design, production, and underground test experience. The targets are negotiated and developed by NNSA federal managers and are vetted with the Management and Operating (M&O) Contractors to arrive at an agreed set of targets/ milestones/ timelines for the scope of work required. Detailed planning and independent reviews validate that these targets, although highly challenging, are also reasonable and achievable.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; RPD; P&PD; PCDs; Stockpile Stewardship Plan (SSP) & Master Nuclear Schedule (MNS) [refurbishment Life Extension Option (LEO) process and notional Advanced Concept Initiatives (ACI) activities]

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The DSW Program has a limited number of specific annual measures to meaningfully assess progress in achieving the program's long-term measures. For FY 2006, they are: 1) complete annual Stockpile Certification & Surety Assessments and Reports; 2) accomplish 95% of PCD-scheduled activity and 100% of prior year's non-completed evaluations (an efficiency measure); 3) for B61-7/11 LEP, complete 100% of Phase 6.4 and 6.5 activity and 6% of Phase 6.6 activity; 4) for W76-1 LEP, complete 85% of Phase 6.3 activity and 45% of Phase 6.4 activity; 5) for W80-3 LEP, complete 90% of Phase 6.3 activity and 45% of Phase 6.4 activity; 6) for W87 LEP, complete 35% of scheduled Phase 6.6 future surveillance production (FP); and 7) for RNEP, complete scheduled Phase 6.2/6.2A activity.

Evidence: NNSA Budget/FYNSP; DSW Program & Implementation Plans; LEP Project Plans; SARs; P&PD; & Site Office Memoranda defining annual expectations; Contractor Program Execution Plans (CPEPs); & Work Authorizations.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The DSW annual performance measures relate directly to the defined activities that can be monitored to determine the success of NNSA's efforts in meeting nuclear weapon stockpile needs and provide the correct framework for annual targets to measure progress. The DSW Program Directors also maintain a detailed set of ambitious annual milestones and deliverables derived from the NNSA Strategic Plan and DSW Program Plan, and approved baselines. The annual measures are supported by the Level 1 and Level 2 milestones that are under change control in the Defense Programs (DP) Milestone Reporting Tool (MRT) database. Level 3 and lower-level milestones supporting the Level 1 and Level 2 milestones are documented in the M&Os Implementation Plans and Work Authorizations. Level 2 milestones are statused by the DSW program managers quarterly with input from the responsible site. In light of the age of the weapons in the stockpile and the lack of underground nuclear testing, the annual targets are ambitious.

Evidence: NNSA Budget/FYNSP; DSW GPRA (Government Performance and Results Act) Unit Program Plan; DSW Implementation Plans; LEP Project Plans; Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21) Project Plans; Warhead Certification Plans; Refurbishment Project Plans; QPRs; DP MRT; Site Level 3 Milestones; & Work Authorizations.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: All DSW partners (NNSA, Campaigns, RTBF, M&Os, DoD, & NWC) commit and work towards the annual/long-term goals. The NNSA federal managers and M&O Contractors are fully involved in determining the appropriate scope of work necessary to meet the DSW program elements (e.g., LEPs; Enduring Weapon Stockpile Systems activities; Retired Weapon Stockpile Systems; Stockpile Services R&D, Certification and Safety; Stockpile Services Management, Technology and Production; and Advanced Concepts). This work scope is then delineated in DSW Program and Implementation Plans and is provided to each supporting Site Office (and M&O contractor) by Work Authorization. Additionally, the NNSA-related DSW efforts are coordinated with and collaborated among DoD stakeholders through the NWC and the directed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. This body brings together the NNSA and DoD organizations such as Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operating Commands, and the Military Services who support the nuclear weapons stockpile. The NWC, according to statute, serves as the focal point for collaborative and coordinated positions and decisions affecting the Nation's nuclear deterrent forces. All stakeholders attend the Project Officers Group's meetings to ensure overall goals of the individual weapons programs are met and provide a status of the annual and long-term performance targets.

Evidence: NWC (Section 179 of Title 10 of the United States Code); Joint DoD-DOE Memorandum of Agreement for the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, March 23, 1997; Implementation Plans; LEP Project Plans and agreements with campaign managers on deliverables; Joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; & NWSM.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: All major DSW activity is monitored by the Nuclear Weapons Council on behalf of the DoD and the Armed Services. There are also many periodic independent evaluations of the DSW-related activities conducted by: Congressionally established groups (e.g., FY 2003 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, April 11, 2003--Foster Panel); Chiles Commission Reports; JASON External Peer Review; The Secretary of Energy's 30-Day Review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program; DoD groups [e.g., U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group Stockpile Assessment Team (SAGSAT) Peer Reviews and Science & Technology (S&T) groups], and other pre-eminent external review groups that evaluate the total scope of DSW activities. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), and DOE Inspector General (IG) also conduct regular independent reviews to evaluate the performance of the major weapon programs. Additional advice is sought through established groups of "external " experts that review specific program elements (e.g., NA-12-sponsored Kitchen Cabinet and NA-11 Science Council). These external reviews are of sufficient scope and quality so as to assure annual nuclear weapons certification to the President.

Evidence: FY 2003 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, April 11, 2003 (Foster Panel); Chiles Commission Report; JASON External Peer Review; DNFSB findings and recommendations; SAGSAT Peer Reviews; GAO Reports; & DOE IG Reports.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Each NNSA program is managed using long-term performance goals with annual targets that cascade seamlessly from the NNSA strategic plan, and also link to supporting milestones, deliverables, and the budgets for program performers. The NNSA program performance measures are the framework for resource allocation decisions made in the annual PPBE Programming and Budgeting processes. The Budget and Reporting (B&R) categories for the DSW Program are listed and linked to performance metrics. All direct and indirect costs to attain the performance results for the DSW Program are reported in the B&R categories. The cost for the NNSA Federal employees is carried in a separate NNSA program direction account, as required by the Congress. In the FY 2005 President's Budget, NNSA initiated a budget request format that includes the current 3 years plus 4 additional years of performance and budget information for each program ("GPRA Units") in the mainline budget justification document. Formerly, the outyear funding and performance targets were included in a separate document, the Future- Years Nuclear Security Program, provided with the budget request. The DSW planning process mirrors the NNSA PPBE process improvements with the primary focus to provide the necessary information to complete all levels of planning and to task experienced senior Program Managers to implement the directed DSW plans. In FY 2005, DSW implemented a B&R Code restructuring, as requested by Congress in FY 2003, to manage the DSW Program, by weapon type. The new structure has improved the visibility and accountability of the individual weapons program within DSW and has provided alignment with the DoD funding cycle.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; NNSA PPBE requirements/documents; LEP Project Plans; Organizational Excellence Initiative for planning process development; & Adoption of DOE Order 413 for Weapons Planning.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: For each major nuclear warhead/bomb refurbishment program under DSW, that is managed and budgeted by weapon system, there is a specific process (either Life Extension Option--LEO--or Phase 6.X Process) that is mandated to assure that the program team addresses alternative design approaches and conducts trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance to arrive at the appropriate options for consideration in the refurbishment decision. The specific process is followed closely by senior NNSA managers through regularly scheduled program reviews to monitor the program's progress in meeting the goals and deliverables, and to guide the activity as necessary.

Evidence: Ongoing Systems Engineering approach; NPR; SCA; DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; LEO Process; BeO (Beryllium Oxide) Issues Study; & Gas Transfer System Optimization Study.

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: The analysis that supported the recent restructuring of DSW to reflect management and reporting by weapon system reflects this type of analysis. The specific process (either Life Extension Option--LEO--or Phase 6.X Process) for each major nuclear warhead/bomb refurbishment program under DSW that is followed provides phases or stages where the program team addresses alternative design approaches and conducts trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance to arrive at the appropriate options for consideration in the refurbishment decision. The process is followed closely by senior NNSA managers through regularly scheduled program reviews to monitor the program's progress in meeting the goals and deliverables, and to guide the activity as necessary.

Evidence: Ongoing Systems Engineering approach; Integrated Construction Program Plan (ICPP); Special Materials Study; NPR; SCA; DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; LEO Process; BeO Issues Study; & Gas Transfer System Optimization Study.

If applicable, does the program assess and compare the potential benefits of efforts within the program to other efforts that have similar goals?

Explanation: DSW activities are unique and cannot be directly compared to any public or commercial program. However, the DSW Program does ensure that the potential benefits derived from a particular major refurbishment are carried through the life-cycle of all warhead/bomb systems via the joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process. For example, during the Phase 6.2/2A (Feasibility Study and Option Down-Select/Design Definition and Cost Study) process where most R&D activities are funded, the issued study determines the technical feasibility of the warhead concept and selected alternatives and refines the warhead design (design definition, program schedule, and cost estimates). As this process is consistently used across all warhead systems, program benefits and information are shared with all design (physics laboratories) and production teams. Additionally, Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs) are documented and coordinated across warhead systems that use similar design and production parts to achieve closure. Common safety and reliability issues, therefore, are beneficially resolved across multiple warhead systems. NNSA has also evaluated the NASA Columbia Accident Investigation Report for Lessons Learned.

Evidence: Joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; Joint Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Management Process; DP Quality Management Policy (QC-1) integrated database; lessons learned W87 LEP; LEO Process; Subcritical Experiments (SCE) Program Plan; SCA; P&PD; Defense Programs NASA Columbia Accident Investigation Report; & Significant Finding Investigation Monthly Reports (classified).

Does the program use a prioritization process to guide budget requests and funding decisions?

Explanation: The DSW Program follows the NNSA Defense Programs Planning Guidance, with annual program priorities, to set DSW priorities for the R&D and production efforts. These priorities are documented in the DSW Program Plan and the P&PD correlating to the FYNSP and updated annually. Being an applied R&D program related specifically to the Refurbishment Schedule and the Annual Assessment Report reported to the President, funding decisions within the DSW Program must achieve the stated program objectives (e.g., R&D outputs, Engineering Releases, & closure of Significant Finding Investigations) when required for ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Budget requests are derived from these priorities and are supported by work scopes presented in the annual DSW R&D and production Implementation Plans. Funding decisions are validated by both the DoD and the NWC via approval of the Phase 6.X Process for individual warhead/bomb systems. Mid-year and annual program reviews of all DSW R&D activities are performed to measure progress on meeting the planning milestones.

Evidence: DP Program Planning Guidance; DSW Program & Implementation Plans; P&PD; DP Milestone Reporting Tool; & SARs for the LEPs.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The Program Managers for major activities routinely collect information to evaluate the performance of their programs and report quarterly to senior managers their program progress. There are Quarterly Program Reviews and Management Reviews conducted with Site Offices and M&O Contractors to review the status of ongoing sub-programs and projects under the DSW program. Implemented in FY 2004 as a new management process, the DP Milestone Reporting Tool (MRT) database contains all DSW Level 1 and Level 2 milestones under change control. The MRT is statused quarterly by both the responsible M&O contractor and federal program manager. MRT data is presented quarterly at the Quarterly Program Reviews (QPRs). Additionally, the R&D activities that are conducted at the nuclear weapons laboratories are reviewed in detail at least twice a year to ascertain the progress and compliance with program goals and objectives.

Evidence: QPR briefings; DP MRT; Quarterly LEP Reviews; annual NNSA Administrator reviews of major program activities; Annual and Mid-Year DSW R&D Program Reviews; & weekly video teleconferences. Also, Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 of the Development and Production (D&P) Manual details the process of reporting and accounting for the nuclear weapon stockpile inventory.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The implementation of the NNSA PPBE and the emphasis on Program Management, with designated NNSA DSW Program Managers for warheads and bombs and DSW performance measures linked to M&O performance evaluations, has increased the accountability for cost, schedule, and performance (scope) for critical DSW work. Program Managers are responsible for allocating funding through the work authorization process and monitoring costs and schedule monthly. Federal program managers are held accountable to their programs by performance metrics in their measures of performance (MOPs) and annual appraisals that link to program performance results. M&Os and other partners are held accountable through Work Authorizations, project plans, and award fees that link to program performance results. Performance is monitored using a documented set of milestone-related targets and measures, the Milestone Reporting Tool database, and annual program/performance reviews.

Evidence: Financial Data/Warehouse reports from DOE Financial Information Management System (FIMS); DSW Implementation Plans; Work Authorizations; Quarterly Program Reviews; Annual Laboratory Assessments; Cost Control Board; Quarterly LEP Reviews; DP MRT; Individual Federal Program Manager MOPs & Performance Appraisals; & annual NNSA Administrator reviews of major program activities.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: The program funding under DSW is projected in Implementation Plans and obligated in a timely manner via Approved Funding Program (AFP) documents and Work Authorizations. Fund expenditures are tracked monthly to assure funds are obligated timely for intended purposes. The Program Managers routinely conduct reviews with their teams to evaluate the progress in obligating and spending program resources according to program requirements.

Evidence: Monthly Financial reports; Quarterly Program Reviews; NNSA Administrator reviews of major program activities; Annual and Mid-Year DSW R&D Program Reviews; Implementation Plans; AFPs; & Work Authorizations.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Because its nuclear weapons activities are unique and are primarily executed by an M&O contractor base in Government-owned facilities, the NNSA lacks the capability to use competitive sourcing/cost comparisons for prime procurements. This limits but does not eliminate the potential to be efficient & cost-effective. PPBE implementation, adopting management & cost reporting by weapon system, and assigning Program Managers for each warhead/bomb program have resulted in strong financial accountability, performance-based management, and improved business practices and procedures that emphasize scope, schedule, and budgetary review. The PPBE Programming Phase uses cost efficiencies (e.g., during FY 2006 Programming, a complex-wide team was established to develop a cost-effective alternate for Gas Transfer Systems). Annual schedule, scope, and cost estimates are devised with site office and M&O contractor input, as are program planning and execution (e.g., Kansas City Plant (KCP) and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) are collaborating on the W76-1 Integrated Project Plan; the W76, W80, and B61 LEP Cost Control Board; and activities to monitor LEP execution cost, schedule, and milestones. During execution, program elements work as a team to efficiently meet targets (e.g., KCP & SNL work closely in Concurrent Design and Manufacturing to achieve cost & production efficiencies in item inventory and scheduling, and implementing central procurement processes and procedures. Progress is tracked against the schedule and the program, M&O contractors, and individual employees are evaluated against the performance targets (e.g., Federal Program Managers evaluate M&O contractors semi-annually, using DSW performance and contract metrics to determine overall performance and incentive award fees.

Evidence: Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 970.5204-87, Cost Reduction, April 1999; Quarterly Program Reviews and Progress Reports; LEP agreements with Campaigns; annual M&O contractor reviews; & NNSA PPBE requirements.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The NNSA efforts under DSW are coordinated and collaborated with DoD stakeholders in the nuclear weapons stockpile through the Nuclear Weapons Council. This body brings together the NNSA and DoD organizations such as OSD Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operating Commands, and the Military Services who support the nuclear weapons stockpile. Collaboration is necessary to perform the annual weapon assessment, to coordinate between the design and production agencies, to maintain Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF), and to compliment the activities of supporting campaigns (e.g., Science, Engineering, Readiness, and Advanced Strategic Computing) which work toward a common Stockpile Stewardship Program goal. Similar coordination is performed through membership in working committees within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Project Officers Group (POG), and many DoD-funded R&D agencies. Cooperation within DOE (e.g., Office of Science) and external to the U.S. with selected allied nations is also effected. Culmination of the collaboration with DSW partners and related programs is the issuance of the Annual Assessment Reports, signed by the Secretaries of Energy & Defense, to the President which ensures that the existing stockpile continues to meet its military requirements without underground nuclear testing.

Evidence: Joint DoD-DOE Memorandum of Agreement for the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, March 23, 1997; Joint DOE-DoD Phase 6.X Process; LEO Process; POG Charters for each nuclear warhead & bomb program; LEP Project Plans (and agreements with Campaigns); & P&PD.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The DSW Program is covered by DOE's financial management policies, procedures, and practices that meet all statutory requirements. The accounting services for NNSA are provided by DOE and these are free of material internal control weaknesses. The DOE's financial statements have been given a clear audit opinion in 7 of the last 8 years. The DSW Program staff reviews accounting reports on a monthly basis to monitor obligations and costs for all projects and sites.

Evidence: DOE Financial Management Orders; NNSA PPBE Guidance Documents located on the NNSA web-site; Quarterly DSW Program Reviews; & Laboratory Quarterly DSW Progress Reports.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The NNSA PPBE process and the assignment of Program Managers for each warhead and bomb effort have been major steps toward resolving management issues. The definition of steps to comply with the new process and the definition of specific Program Management approaches have helped NNSA program teams to institute needed controls and measurement techniques that help guide projects conducted under DSW to their successful conclusion. Internally, the NNSA uses separate Campaign Programs to augment the DSW with required specialized scientific, engineering, and production readiness resources to minimize DSW internal management/priority conflicts. The DOE Inspector General audited several Defense Programs' high profile projects, including construction and operation of testing facilities and resolution of Significant Finding Investigations. They reported areas of opportunities for improvement which have the support of NNSA management and are undergoing evaluation and implementation within the re-engineering process. For example, in FY 2004, two LEP programs were re-baselined to align FYNSP funding to support the First Production Unit (FPU) delivery dates. The re-baselining efforts were coordinated through detailed estimates at completions and project management principles established from lessons learned from the W87 LEP and the NASA Columbia Accident Investigation Report and implementation of NNSA's QC-1. Although the re-baselining impacted multiple sites and Defense Programs project prioritization in the outyears, the LEPs are on track to meet FPU through sound management of realistic resource-loaded schedules.

Evidence: Quarterly Program Reviews; Agreements with Campaigns; NNSA Administrator reviews of major program activities; NNSA PPBE requirements; DOE IG Audit Reports on the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility and SFIs; SFI quarterly reports; & Foster Panel Report.

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: The NNSA PPBE process and the assignment of Program Managers for each warhead and bomb effort have been major steps toward resolving management issues. The use of annual Program and Implementation Plans with performance measures, LEP NNSA Program Plans and schedules, P&PD, and configuration-controlled Level 1 and Level 2 milestones for major DSW efforts (with corresponding site--Level 3 milestones) have helped define the deliverables tied to cost and schedule requirements. The definition of steps to comply with the new process and the definition of specific Program Management approaches have helped NNSA program teams to institute needed controls and measurement techniques that help guide projects conducted under DSW to their successful conclusion.

Evidence: Quarterly Program Reviews; NNSA Administrator reviews of major program activities; NNSA PPBE requirements; DP MRT; DSW Program & Implementation Plans; LEP Plans; SS-21 Project Plans; Warhead Certification Plans; & SARs for LEPs.

For R&D programs other than competitive grants programs, does the program allocate funds and use management processes that maintain program quality?

Explanation:  

Evidence:  

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The NNSA DSW is meeting its requirements for stockpile maintenance and production to assure military operational requirements are met. In addition, the stockpile evaluation activities are being conducted to allow the assessment of stockpile safety and performance. DSW's current long-term R&D performance measure is the completion of the Phase 6.X Process for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). In FY 2006, DSW is scheduled to and is on track to complete the Phase 6.2/2A Feasibility Study. Long-term annual performance goals are achieved with documented evidence through Quarterly Program Reviews and MRT updates with the Program Managers for major Life Extension Programs and current stockpile systems. Any schedule adjustments to jointly approved NNSA-DoD programs are routinely negotiated and reviewed by the appropriate Project Officers Group and the NWC stakeholders prior to implementation. The planning for future DSW refurbishment efforts and other long-range activities continues to be assessed on an annual basis through the Life Extension Options process and associated Component Decision Document (CDD) and P&PD.

Evidence: NNSA Budget/FYNSP; production/delivery schedules; P&PD; DSW Program Plan; Master Nuclear Schedule; P&PD; CDDs; DP MRT; Interactions with the appropriate warhead or bomb POG; & individual Federal Manager measures of performance (MOPs).

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The NNSA DSW elements are jointly planned and reviewed by the Department of Defense through the Nuclear Weapons Council process to assure that the program is efficiently and effectively meeting the performance goals and needs of the Nation's nuclear deterrent policies and requirements. This process is focused to assure a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear warhead stockpile to meet the National Security policies and related military requirements. Most annual performance goals have been met. However, because of funding priorities in FY 2004, DSW accepted the schedule risk on the completion of several annual performance goals. Delays associated with the completion of hydrodynamic tests and burn codes, and re-baselining LEPs have impacted the DSW ability to achieve all Level 2 milestones associated with the PCD.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; NNSA Budget/FYNSP; Nuclear Weapons Council deliberations; DSW Program & Implementation Plans; DP MRT; & Project Officer's Groups' recommendations.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Within the limitations described in Q3.4, NNSA has improved cost efficiencies. The DSW annually establishes program performance measures for the M&O contractors and the Federal Program Managers evaluate the M&O contractor efficiency and effectiveness in meeting these measures to determine contract award fee(s). Detailed monthly financial reports are used by Program Managers to closely track expenditures and obligations. The NNSA Federal workforce re-engineering initiative has also focused on combining functions and has resulted in a re-definition of roles and responsibilities to improve efficiencies in DSW program direction and management. The benefits of the NNSA re-engineering effort are showing positive results within the DSW program and DSW (weapons) sub-programs are significantly more effective (than the prior functional approach) and greater accountability has eliminated previously perceived duplication of effort. For FY 2006, DSW Program Planning Guidance to the M&O contractors includes directing work toward, and demonstration of, not less than 10% efficiencies at the DSW sites as well as determination of cost/unit for dismantlements and cost/unit for surveillance activities. Additionally, BWXT Y-12 is providing DSW weapons hardware and other technical services to the Design Agencies in a highly responsive manner in terms of timeliness, quality and cost-effectiveness--meaning that BWXT Y-12's project performance will be judged to be "faster, better, and cheaper" when compared with similar projects & earlier evaluation periods. The new DSW B&R budget & accounting structure will increase M&O cost accounting consistency and accuracy reporting. The I-MANAGE financial system will soon be available to generate better financial reports to integrate cost reports & better evaluate DSW efficiencies and cost-effectiveness.

Evidence: NNSA Monthly Financial Reports; Annual M&O contractor program evaluation by Federal Managers; Annual Certification Reports to the President and to Congress; W80 and W76 LEP Cost Control Boards; laboratory and production plant Performance-Based Incentives Programs; & NNSA Reengineering efforts and related reports to Congress.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: No other program has the mission, scope, or operating environment that the DSW has. This is a federal government program with a unique mission and where M&O contractors perform highly technical and classified R&D and production activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear warhead deterrent forces. In some respects, this compares to large DoD activities that procure military equipment from industrial contractors; however, it differs in that there is no specific competitive efforts for warhead development and production external to the NNSA complex. There are some joint individual R&D and production programs with the DoD that might be comparable such as the integrated Arming, Firing, and Fuzing (AF&F) systems for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile warheads. The NNSA also jointly works with the DoD through joint Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) for research and development on a variety of technologies such as fuzing, penetrator mechanics, and sensors. This does not mean that DSW works in a vacuum. The joint DoD activity provides some progress comparisons as does work with foreign governments. DSW also reviews selected aspects of the commercial R&D and production environment for lessons learned and state-of-the art concepts & capabilities. There are also steps being taken within DSW to institute systems engineering approaches, stronger program management techniques, and incentives for program performance that are expected to improve this element, based on efforts in other programs.

Evidence: President's Budget; Joint DOE-DoD MOUs; POG meetings; LEP Management Plan; NNSA M&O contractor evaluations; & GAO Reports.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The DSW Program achieves its annual and long-term targets with the continual oversight of various independent technical panels and experts groups focused on current evaluations of program elements. As independent program evaluation reports are issued, NNSA addresses identified concerns with the goal of continuous improvement to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Within Defense Programs, the Kansas City Plant has recently achieved ISO (International Standards Organization) 9000 status in managing its production facilities with the highest certifiable quality. The NNSA is striving for similar levels of high quality performance among its M&O contractors across the weapons complex. Additionally, In FY 2004, the independent JASON report evaluated the use of a technical approach called Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) within the annual stockpile assessment process under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, leading to the conclusion that QMU is an effective tool in validating the DSW assessment of stockpile reliability. External independent program evaluations of NNSA DSW activities are conducted by the Congressionally established Foster Panel, the NNSA Administrator's Advisory Committee, DoD expert groups (e.g., the U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group Stockpile Assessment Team (SAGSAT) and Science and Technology (S&T) Groups), and other pre-eminent external review groups that evaluate the total scope of DSW activities. Additionally, the DNFSB, OMB, GAO, and DOE IG regularly evaluate and report on major NNSA DSW weapons programs. All these external reviews are of sufficient scope, scrutiny and quality so as to assure the continued DSW programmatic validation of the annual nuclear weapons certification to the President.

Evidence: DNFSB reports; Foster Panel report; SAG S&T reviews; POG reviews; & JASON External Peer Review.

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The DSW Program Managers establish annual budgets and performance metrics for the M&O Contractors to achieve program goals and milestones. The DSW program performance goals are monitored through performance of stockpile maintenance, evaluation, dismantlement/disposal, production support, and R&D work elements and are measured against budget and schedule identified in the DSW Program Plan. The Program Managers work with each of the M&O contractor project teams to identify budget and schedule issues and to facilitate project integration throughout the course of the projects to ensure product delivery, on time and within budget. When adjustments are required, the Federal program managers and the M&O contractors work together to redefine the planned scope and milestones to meet program needs. Revisions and impacts to other DSW sub-programs are considered and higher NNSA managers are included to evaluate the crosscutting impacts to the total DSW effort.

Evidence: NNSA Budget/FYNSP; DSW Program Plan; Program Reviews; & DOE Financial Information Management System reports.