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MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT:

Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Guidance for Countering Biological Threats Resource Priorities

Countering Biological Threats and promoting the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) continue to be high priorities for the President and his Administration. The attached list of Countering Biological Threats priorities was developed by the National Security Council staff in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), endorsed by the Interagency Policy Committee on Countering Biological Threats, and is consistent with the objectives and focus of the United States National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats and the GHSA.

The purpose of this resource guidance for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 budget process is to enable your department or agency to allocate appropriate resources to implement United States Government priorities to counter biological threats. While developing budget submissions, your department or agency should focus on programs and activities highlighted in the attached priorities memo (Tab A).

In your FY2017 budget submissions to OMB in early September 2015, please identify which programs, projects, and activities align to each of the priorities in the attached guidance. Your department's or agency's submission to OMB should also include a brief narrative that explains how its activities to counter biological threats support the FY2017 policy priorities. We all have a critical role in fulfilling these priorities, and we look to each of you to budget for those priorities relevant to your department or agency within available resources in FY2017.

In a time of constrained resources, departments and agencies should continue to direct resources to high-priority activities and identify potential reductions or eliminations in lesseffective, lower quality, or lower priority programs. Departments and agencies should explain in their budget submissions how they are redirecting available resources (within existing authorities) from lower priority areas to activities that counter biological threats and address the priorities described in the attached guidance. It is also important that departments and agencies engaged in complementary activities consult with each other during the budget planning process so that resources are coordinated to maximize their impact and avoid unnecessary duplication. Where appropriate and consistent with the law, departments and agencies should consider leveraging programs with other public and private-sector institutions. Department and agency submissions should meet the requirements outlined in the FY2017 Budget/Guidance memorandum from OMB, titled "M-15-11."

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Lisa O. Monaco
Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and
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Shaun Donovan Director Office of Management and Budget

#### Attachment

Tab A Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Guidance for Countering Biological Threats Resource Priorities

### CC:

Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy

Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs

Deputy Assistant to the President and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

# Tab A

# FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET GUIDANCE FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL THREATS RESOURCE PRIORITIES

Background. Presidential Policy Directive-2 (PPD-2) directs the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Countering Biological Threats to provide policy guidance on priority areas of interest related to the National Strategy each spring on Countering Biological Threats to inform annual department and agency budget requests. Similar to Fiscal Years (FY) 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are jointly issuing the Countering Biological Threat Resource Priorities Memo for FY2017, while leveraging input from Federal departments and agencies without circumventing their internal budget processes.

## FY2017 Priorities Associated with Countering Biological Threats

• Implementing the Global Health Security Agenda. One result of an interconnected world is the increasing opportunities for human, animal, and zoonotic diseases to emerge and spread globally. Today's health security threats arise from at least five sources: (1) the emergence and spread of new microbes; (2) the globalization of travel and food supply; (3) the rise of drug-resistant pathogens; (4) the acceleration of biological science capabilities and the risk that these capabilities may cause the inadvertent or intentional release of pathogens; and (5) continued concerns about the acquisition, development, and use of biological agents by state and non-state actors. The Ebola epidemic highlights gaps in the global system for managing emerging biological threats and has demonstrated the need for sustained U.S. leadership to strengthen global capability to prevent, detect and respond to biological threats, whether naturally occurring, deliberate, or accidental. In keeping with the emphasis in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats on promoting global health security, the objectives

¹ For Global Health Security Agenda objectives that are consistent with the five end-states outlined in the document, "International Engagement to Reduce Biological Threats," this will be achieved through improving United States Government coordination and implementation of key international bioengagement activities aimed at reducing biological risks in priority countries, among other activities. The Countering Biological Threats IPC has identified the following countries as continuing national-level priorities for countering biological threats in order to better harmonize and coordinate interagency bioengagement activities toward those end-states: Afghanistan, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Vietnam, and Yemen.

and targets outlined below form the basis of the Administration's Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and should be prioritized in FY2017.

- Implementing the Decisions of the 8th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): The 8th BWC RevCon will take place in November 2016; the United States is advancing a series of initiatives to bolster the BWC and strengthen its role as a key international forum for countering biological threats. Success will require that the United States not only gain the agreement of other nations, but that we are also able to adequately resource these efforts.
- Improving intelligence on deliberate biological threats:

  Timely and accurate information about capabilities and intent of those who seek to subvert the life sciences is difficult to obtain. The Intelligence Community, in collaboration with the broader United States Government and life sciences communities, must seek to close the gaps in our nation's intelligence and analytical capabilities directed at countering biological threats.

Departments and agencies play critical roles in fulfilling these priorities and should identify these priorities, as well as programs and activities that reflect them, when building their FY2017 budget requests.

In support of the GHSA, the following priorities and targets should be prioritized in FY2017:

# Global Health Security Agenda Objectives and Target

### Global Health Security Agenda Objectives

1. Prevent Avoidable Epidemics: including naturally occurring outbreaks and intentional or accidental releases.

The IPC will work to prioritize capacity needs in these countries, informed by the sub-IPC effort. It should be noted that departments and agencies prioritize programmatic efforts in a number of countries, and this list is not intended to exclude those efforts. The U.S. government has made a commitment to assist at least 30 countries to achieve the targets of the Global Health Security Agenda. The Ebola Emergency supplemental will support the phase one countries, which include: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote D'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam. FY 2017 Budget should continue to support additional countries within the base to reach the U.S. government target of at least 30 countries.

- Prevent the emergence and spread of antimicrobial drug resistant organisms and emerging zoonotic diseases and strengthen international regulatory frameworks governing food safety: Act to reduce the individual and institutional factors that enable antimicrobial resistance and the emergence of zoonotic disease threats, increase surveillance and early detection of antimicrobial-resistant microorganisms and novel zoonotic diseases; measurably enhance antimicrobial stewardship; strengthen supply chains; promote safe practices in livestock production and the marketing of animals; and promote the appropriate and responsible use of antibiotics in all settings, including developing strategies with host countries to improve food safety.
- Promote national biosafety and biosecurity systems:

  Promote the development of specific multi-sectoral approaches in countries and regions for managing biological materials to support diagnostic, research, and biosurveillance activities, including identifying, securing, safely monitoring, and storing dangerous pathogens in a minimal number of facilities while advancing global biosurveillance, and frameworks to advance safe and responsible conduct.
- Reduce the number and magnitude of infectious disease outbreaks. Countries will have in place effective programs for vaccination against epidemic-prone diseases and nosocomial infection control.
- 2. Detect Threats Early: including detecting, characterizing, and transparently reporting emerging biological threats early, through real-time biosurveillance.
  - Launch, strengthen, and link global networks for real-time biosurveillance: Promote the establishment of monitoring systems that can predict and identify infectious disease threats; interoperable, networked information-sharing platforms and bioinformatic systems; and networks that link to regional disease detection hubs.
  - Strengthen the global norm of rapid, transparent reporting and sample sharing in the event of health emergencies of international concern: Strengthen capabilities for accurate and transparent reporting to the World Health

Organization (WHO), World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) during emergencies, with rapid sample and reagent sharing between countries and international organizations.

- Develop and deploy novel diagnostics and strengthen laboratory systems: Strengthen country and regional capacity at the point-of-care and point-of-need to enable accurate, timely collection and analysis of information, and laboratory systems capable of safely and accurately detecting all major dangerous pathogens with minimal biorisk.
- Train and deploy an effective biosurveillance workforce:
  Build country capacity for a trained and functioning
  biosurveillance workforce, with trained disease detectives
  and laboratory scientists.
- 3. Respond Rapidly and Effectively to biological threats of international concern.
  - Develop an interconnected global network of Emergency Operations Centers and multi-sectoral response to biological incidents: Promote establishment of Emergency Operations Centers and trained, functioning, multi-sectoral rapid response teams, with access to a real-time information system. Promote capacity to attribute the source.
  - Improve global access to medical and non-medical countermeasures during health emergencies: Increase country and regional capacity to produce or procure personal protective equipment, medications, vaccines, and technical expertise, as well as the capacity to plan for and deploy non-medical countermeasures. The United States will develop and strengthen policies and operational frameworks to share public and animal health and medical personnel and countermeasures with partners.

### Global Health Security Agenda Target

### Overarching Target:

Over the next 5 years, the United States commits to working with at least 30 partner countries (containing at least 4 billion people) to prevent, detect, and effectively respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally-occurring or

caused by accidental or intentional releases of dangerous pathogens. We call on other countries to join in this effort to realize the vision of a world where all 7 billion people are effectively protected against infectious disease threats.

We will work with partner countries on specific objectives to prevent, detect, and effectively respond to infectious disease threats and will measure our own progress through the following metrics and milestones. We invite partner countries to use metrics appropriate to their own situations, including these and others:

<u>Prevent</u>: Countries will have systems, policies, and procedures in place to prevent or mitigate avoidable outbreaks. Considering their own vulnerabilities, countries should prioritize and implement the following:

- Surveillance to monitor and slow antimicrobial resistance, with at least one reference laboratory capable of identifying at least three of the seven WHO priority antimicrobial resistant pathogens using standardized, reliable detection assays and reporting these results when appropriate to international or International Health Regulations (IHR) focal points;
- A whole-of-government national biosecurity system is in place that ensures collections of especially dangerous pathogens are identified, held, secured, and monitored in a minimal number of facilities with biosafety and biosecurity best practices in place; biorisk management training and educational outreach is conducted to promote a shared culture of responsibility, reduce dual use biological risks, and ensure safe transfer of biological agents; and country-specific biosecurity legislation, laboratory certification, and pathogen control measures are in place as appropriate;
- Adopted behaviors, policies, and practices that minimize the spillover of zoonotic diseases into human populations.
- Immunization of at least 90 percent of the country's 1-year-old population with at least one dose of measles-containing vaccine as measured by coverage surveys or administrative data.

<u>Detect</u>: Countries will have real-time biosurveillance and effective modern diagnostics in place that are able to reliably conduct at least five of the 10 core tests (including

point-of-care and laboratory-based diagnostics) on appropriately identified and collected outbreak specimens transported safely and securely to accredited laboratories from at least 80 percent of districts in the country). The United States will also support countries in substantially accomplishing:

- Surveillance for three core syndromes indicative of potential public health emergencies conducted according to international standards;
- Country and regional capacity to analyze and link data toward real-time biosurveillance systems, including interoperable, interconnected electronic reporting systems within the country, which can include clinical, laboratory, environmental testing, product safety and quality, and bioinformatics data;
- Timely and accurate disease reporting according to WHO, OIE, and FAO requirements;
- A workforce including physicians, veterinarians, biostatisticians, laboratory scientists, and at least one trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 population who can systematically cooperate to meet relevant IHR and Performance of Veterinary Services core competencies.

Respond: Countries will have a public health Emergency Operation Center functioning according to minimum common standards; maintaining trained, functioning, multi-sectoral rapid response teams and "real-time" biosurveillance laboratory networks and information systems; and trained EOC staff capable of activating a coordinated emergency response within 120 minutes of the identification of a public health emergency. The United States will also support countries in substantially accomplishing:

- In the event of a suspected or confirmed biological attack, have the capacity to link public health and law enforcement for the purpose of attribution;
- A national framework for sending and receiving medical countermeasures and public health and medical personnel from and to international partners during public health emergencies.