The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon
How the U.S. and the international community will block all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon
Iran Deal Watch Live
After many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 -- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany -- along with the European Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful going forward.
This deal stands on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in November of 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 that set the requirements for the deal with the P5+ 1 and Iran, alongside the European Union announced today.
Now, with this deal in place, the U.S., our allies, and the international community can know that tough, new requirements will keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Here's how:
Iran Deal Facts
"Anytime, anywhere" inspections sound good. Why doesn’t this deal require those?
This deal ensures IAEA access when needed, where needed to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. “Anytime, anywhere” inspections are simply unnecessary thanks to the deal.
Under this deal, Iran will allow robust monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. IAEA inspectors have the right to a physical or technical presence in all of Iran’s nuclear sites and will conduct regular monitoring of Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle and supply chain, from uranium mines and mills to centrifuge production, assembly, and storage facilities. This means Iran would need to set up an entirely parallel set of facilities and a separate supply chain if it sought to have a covert nuclear weapons program. This kind of program would be extremely difficult to hide under this deal. Standard practice under the Additional Protocol, which Iran will implement under this deal, is that the IAEA can request access to any suspicious location with 24 hours’ notice. This deal does not change that baseline.
But there are situations in which the IAEA and a State might negotiate the terms of access before the IAEA actually goes on site, and for that reason, the JCPOA sets an outer limit for those discussions. Even in the circumstance that it took up to 24 days for IAEA access to a suspicious location in the event of a dispute, radioactive evidence would almost certainly still be present in many of the core facilities Iran would need for a covert nuclear weapons program. In other words, Iran would not be able to cover its tracks before granting access, and the United States would be watching, so we would know if Iran tried to do so.
Got more questions?
Blocking the Four Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon
The Uranium pathways at Natanz and Fordow
The Plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor
A covert pathway to building a secret nuclear program
What Iran’s Nuclear Program Would Look Like Without This Deal