U.S.-EU Joint Statement
of the Trade and Technology Council
16 May 2022
Paris-Saclay, France

We, the co-chairs of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”), United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, European Commission Executive Vice President Margrethe Vestager, and European Commission Executive Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis, joined by European Commissioner Thierry Breton, held the second meeting of the Trade and Technology Council in Paris-Saclay on 16 May 2022, hosted by the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and issued the following Joint Statement on behalf of the United States of America and the European Union:

1. The U.S.-EU partnership is a cornerstone of our shared strength, prosperity, and commitment to freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. In the past year, we have strengthened, deepened, and elevated our relationship. As recent events have proven, strong transatlantic bonds and cooperation on issues related to trade, technology, and security are more important than ever.

2. The world has changed dramatically since the first TTC meeting in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2021. The United States and European Union strongly condemn Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, as a premeditated and unprovoked further invasion of a sovereign state in violation of international law, which threatens the multilateral rules-based order. The United States and the European Union support the Ukrainian people and their right to choose their own future.

3. The United States and the European Union remain committed to upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. We have cooperated closely to impose significant consequences on Russia for its continued aggression against Ukraine. The foundation that we cemented through the TTC was indispensable for fostering the unprecedented level of cooperation on export controls and sanctions in response to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, both between the United States and European Union and with other allies and partners.

4. We plan to continue coordinating our actions to mitigate the negative impacts of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on the global economy, and on Ukraine’s economy in particular. We remain resolute in our efforts to work jointly with Ukraine to rebuild its economy and revive its entrepreneurial vigour, facilitate trade and investment, and address global challenges resulting from Russia’s actions. This includes addressing supply chain ruptures created by Russia’s aggression, with regards to industrial and food commodities. The TTC intends to develop common approaches and explore shared solutions toward improving supply chain resiliency, fostering predictability and trade diversification.

5. We confirm that we will continue to oppose actors who threaten the multilateral rules-based order and fundamental principles of international law. To protect our citizens, we will draw upon our bilateral trade and investment relations, our joint technology leadership, the transatlantic security partnership, and our shared democratic values. Our cooperation and coordination in the TTC is essential to this effort, and we are committed to maintaining the TTC as a central pillar of our transatlantic partnership.
6. We embrace the vision articulated in the Declaration of the Future of the Internet and intend to translate its principles into practice, including those concerning universal access, human rights, openness, and fair competition. We strongly condemn the Russian government’s actions to partially shut down, restrict, or degrade Internet connectivity, to censor content, and to intimidate and arrest independent media. These actions are limiting the ability of people in Russia to access credible and independent information and are undermining the exercise of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association. Russia has repeatedly used the veil of disinformation to obscure war crimes and other atrocities committed by Russian forces, despite horrifying images and reports of torture, sexual violence, and the execution of Ukrainians. We also believe that it is important to combat Russian disinformation in third countries, including with regard to food security, including with our G7 partners. We plan to continue coordination to protect freedom of expression and the integrity of information and to better understand the information ecosystem to advance these goals.

7. We are convinced that the shared transatlantic, democratic, rights-respecting approach that puts individuals at the center is the best way to address global challenges and opportunities presented by both the digital transformation and the green transition. We seek in the TTC to benefit our citizens, workers, businesses, and consumers by pursuing an open global market based on fair competition and contestable digital markets.

8. We intend to continue to use the TTC to collaborate closely to further our values, foster participation in international standardization organizations for civil society organizations, start-ups, small and medium sized enterprises, and to protect our joint interests in international standardization activities underpinned by core World Trade Organization (“WTO”) principles. We also intend to engage in relevant international organizations and use other tools at our disposal to protect our interests.

9. We recognize the importance of an open and fair multilateral rules-based system and the need to reform the WTO, including its negotiating, monitoring and dispute settlement function, to build a more durable and viable trading system. We share a desire to work together to ensure concrete progress in this regard at the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference. We resolve to take effective action to address trade-distortive non-market policies and practices, including through our trilateral cooperation with Japan, by identifying problems due to non-market policies and practices; identifying gaps in existing enforcement tools and where further work is needed to develop new tools, discussing cooperation in utilizing existing tools, and identifying areas where further work is needed to develop rules to address such practices.

10. We recognize the importance of emerging technologies for global prosperity and security. We are committed to exchange information and explore opportunities for collaboration in our research and development agendas, notably for Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), telecommunication technologies beyond 5G and 6G, and quantum computing. Given that 6G will be a critical global infrastructure, common approaches towards 6G international standards are particularly relevant. We recognize the potential of earth observation and AI-supported digital models of the earth in the fight against climate change.

11. We intend to accelerate our actions to promote the responsible use of technologies, including by working together on policies, standards and technology governance, to foster the use of critical and emerging technologies in line with democratic values and protection of human rights. We are committed to promoting the responsibility to refrain from the
arbitrary or unlawful use of surveillance products or services. We are also committed to promoting respect for human rights by businesses, including by highlighting best practices in due diligence, and engaging with civil society and the private sector. The United States and European Union also plan to step up actions against the misuse of technologies as tools of repression and as tools of arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, coercion, and cyber threats. These actions will include building further digital and cyber capacities. We resolve to strengthen our cooperation on protecting human rights defenders online, promoting the open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet, and combatting government-imposed Internet shutdowns.

12. We share the view that online platforms should be transparent and be held accountable to provide services that are safe, respect our democratic societies, and promote freedom of expression and reliable information. The United States and European Union also share a commitment to effective oversight over the role of online platforms in the spread, amplification, and mitigation of illegal and harmful conduct and content and undertake to explore concrete projects to support such oversight. We recognize the global nature of online platform services and aim to cooperate on the enforcement of our respective policies for ensuring a safe, fair and open online environment.

13. We embrace a green transition that will benefit our citizens, workers, businesses, farmers, and consumers in an open global market based on fair competition. We plan to encourage trade and deployment of goods and technologies that can help achieve our common and global climate and environment goals, while working to reduce the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) intensity of a wide array of goods and services. We intend to cooperate in areas such as lifecycle GHG assessment methodologies, including carbon footprinting, green public procurement, and electric vehicle charging infrastructure and interoperable connection, which can help to reduce energy dependency on fossil fuels and support energy autonomy. Our efforts, wherever possible, will look to build on and further empower similar private sector initiatives, such as the First Movers Coalition and the Green Digital Coalition.

14. We reaffirm that we will intensify our work to resolve trade disagreements to our mutual advantage, reduce unnecessary barriers to bilateral trade and investment, and strive to prevent new ones from emerging. We will instead seek to create new opportunities for trade and investment. We regard each other as trustworthy and reliable trade, technology, and investment partners as well as security partners. We will continue to seek amicable solutions to our differences on trade and to ensure that transatlantic trade flows reflect and promote our many shared interests and values.

15. We are acutely aware that trade in technologies can be pivotal to the ability of autocratic countries to implement authoritarian policies, perpetrate human rights violations and abuses, engage in other forms of repression, and undermine the security of other nations. We share a desire for cooperation through coordinated actions using our export control and investment screening tools in defense of our security. We are committed to deeply enhancing our cooperation and to supporting information exchange on dual-use technologies and export controls. The work of the TTC has already proven foundational in developing common approaches in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including by facilitating an unprecedented level of cooperation on export controls.

16. We recognize the importance of having effective investment screening mechanisms in place throughout the European Union and in the United States in order to address national
security risks, and within the European Union, for public order, while remaining open for investment. We recognize the value of joint engagement to ensure a better understanding of similarities and differences in approach and, in particular, shared and individual national security risks, allowing us to develop more effective collaboration in the future.

17. We resolve to collaborate to reduce dependencies on unreliable sources of strategic supply, promote reliable sources in our supply chain cooperation, and engage with trusted partners. We share a desire to mitigate jointly the negative effects of sudden supply chain ruptures such as those created by Russia’s aggression, for example in the area of critical materials.

18. We welcome the interest and active involvement of stakeholders who have contributed significantly in the TTC process, and we underline our commitment to continue our in-depth engagement with labor unions, businesses, and civil society. We welcome the multiple engagements that working groups have held with broad groups of interested parties, and the recently initiated, EU-financed Trade and Technology Dialogue. We look forward to continuing this engagement and to identifying new opportunities to bring together diverse stakeholders from across the United States and the European Union. We embrace openness and transparency in our work and will endeavour to make essential information about our meetings and deliverables public.

19. In light of our shared political convictions, and based on the discussions held at the inaugural TTC meeting in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2021, recorded in the U.S.-EU TTC Inaugural Joint Statement, we welcome the following key outcomes since that meeting:

i. Formation of an Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) sub-group to realise our commitment to the responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI and our joint support for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Recommendation on AI. This sub-working group is working to develop a joint roadmap on evaluation and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management, as well as a common project on privacy-enhancing technologies. We will continue to collaborate on the implementation of the OECD AI principles to further our mutual understanding of how to integrate trustworthy and responsible AI into society. This includes working together to identify and oppose rights-violating systems of social scoring. Finally, we have launched a study to explore the impact of AI on the workforce in two fields, recruitment and logistics.

ii. Creation of an U.S.-EU Strategic Standardisation Information (“SSI”) mechanism to enable information-sharing on international standards development, relevant to the technology and economic interests of the United States and European Union. The United States and the European Union aim to identify proactive opportunities for collaborative action and to promote and defend our common interests in international standards activities for critical and emerging technologies.

iii. In recognition of the positive contribution of transatlantic trade to resilient supply chains, and of our shared vulnerabilities to critical supply chains for semiconductors, critical minerals, clean energy, and pharmaceuticals, an understanding to work towards guiding principles, complementary and joint actions, and cooperation to mitigate risks and to advance the resilience of U.S. and EU supply chains, while confirming our commitment to avoid unnecessary barriers to trade, which could negatively affect the production or export opportunities of the United States and European Union. This includes cooperation to diversify supply chains for rare earth
magnets; advance transparency in and diversification of the solar supply chain; promote private sector efforts to increase transparency in the semiconductors value chain and in demand to anticipate shortages; enhance cooperation to provide early warning of semiconductor shortages; and to avoid subsidy races by advancing common goals for incentives granted in respective territories and an exchange of information regarding such incentives on a reciprocal basis. We also welcome recent announcements of major investments to expand innovative semiconductor manufacturing in both the United States and European Union.

iv. A Joint Statement on the importance of addressing security risks from high-risk vendors and fostering security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the digital and information and communications technology and services (“ICTS”) supply chain. Whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the importance of secure, trusted, and resilient ICTS to our national security and sovereignty, we reaffirm the ambition of the 2021 Ministerial Declaration of the G7 Digital and Technology Ministers’ meeting to promote secure, resilient, diverse, competitive, transparent, and sustainable digital, telecommunications, and ICTS infrastructure supply chain.

v. The launch of a dedicated taskforce on public financing for secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains in third countries. The taskforce has the objective to promote the use of trusted/non-high-risk suppliers, share information on our respective efforts to support secure, resilient, and rights-respecting ICTS projects in third countries, and collaborate on joint U.S.-EU public financing of ICTS projects in third-countries based on common overarching principles. The taskforce will also determine how like-minded partners and international financial institutions, including at the Member State level as appropriate, can strengthen our ability to provide the financing that our partners need to improve their ICTS infrastructure and provide secure, trusted digital services to their citizens. These efforts should support U.S. and EU flagship global development initiatives.

vi. The establishment of our unprecedented cooperation on export controls, which formed a significant portion of our response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with a view to support further common approaches, including the update of controlled goods list taking into account decisions of multilateral export control regimes, to cooperate with partners beyond the United States and European Union, and to regularly consult on new actions that could affect the United States or the European Union.

vii. The engagement in practical exercises as part of a coordinated effort to share best practices on investment screening cooperation, with a view to remaining open to foreign investment, to deepen our understanding of security risks related to specific sensitive technologies and the policy tools addressing those risks, increasing our collective security, and supporting our open investment environments, while protecting our security interests.

viii. The creation of a policy dialogue within the TTC on core issues of content moderation, as well as with a commitment to developing a common analytical framework for identifying foreign information manipulation and interference that should enable faster information exchange and effective countermeasures, especially in crisis situations. We also intend to establish a Cooperation Framework on Information Integrity in crisis situations, including on data governance and platform governance.
risks pertaining to a crisis. The Framework will initially focus on ongoing issues related to Russian aggression, including Russia’s actions to manipulate and censor information.

ix. The establishment of a tripartite Trade and Labor Dialogue within the TTC, involving representatives of trade unions, businesses, and the European Commission and U.S. Government, to explore ways to promote internationally-recognized labor rights, including the eradication of forced labor and child labor; and through social dialogue, assist workers and employers to make successful digital and green transitions, remain globally competitive, and enjoy broad and inclusive prosperity. In parallel with the Trade and Labor Dialogue, we intend to cooperate on other efforts to promote internationally recognized labor rights and the eradication of forced labor and child labor, by promoting responsible business conduct, increasing the effectiveness of trade and labor engagements, and exploring possible joint technical cooperation and funding in support of these trade and labor engagements.

x. The establishment of an early alert dialogue on shared trade concerns regarding initiatives or measures of third-countries, and a mechanism to consult each other on bilateral barriers at an early stage, in order to enhance communication and exchange of information on measures or initiatives that could pose significant non-tariff trade barriers for the United States and/or the European Union.

xi. The identification of specific areas or products, including those identified by industry stakeholders, where strengthened cooperation on conformity assessment could facilitate transatlantic trade.

xii. The joint intention to intensify U.S.-EU cooperation in the area of public procurement, for example in areas such as digital infrastructure, health, or high-tech industrial products.

xiii. The United States and the European Union highlight the disruptions to Ukraine’s economy that the unprovoked and unjustified invasion by Russia causes and our unwavering support to Ukraine. We note that the deepening of their respective existing trade relations with Ukraine can be a key facilitator in that regard. We therefore intend to identify measures that will expand trade with and investment in Ukraine, as a means of mitigating the devastation caused by Russia’s ongoing military aggression and strengthening the Ukrainian economy. The United States and the European Union have therefore taken concrete and rapid steps to facilitate Ukraine’s access to their markets.

20. We charge all working groups to build on progress made thus far to implement concrete actions in advance of the next ministerial meeting, in consultation with stakeholders by making full use of the new Trade and Technology Dialogue facility. Specifically, we look forward to working together on a roadmap for AI risk management tools in support of standards and regulations; new initiatives to alleviate supply chain pressures in key sectors; the creation of a mechanism to exchange relevant information on export restrictions; convergence on methodologies and reporting on investment screening to improve accountability; issuance of a set of government recommendations on measures to assist small and medium enterprises to access digital tools to grow their business; and further work to coordinate our trade response to non-market policies and practices and to deepen bilateral trade and investments.
21. We jointly endorse the conclusions and statements of the TTC working groups listed in the annexes. They reflect the implementation of the objectives determined at our meeting in Pittsburgh, as well as work plans and goals for the future. We intend to continue achieving concrete and tangible results of value to stakeholders. We task working groups to continue working in line with these jointly determined objectives.

22. We plan to meet again for the next TTC before the end of 2022 in the United States to advance new concrete results and to steer further work and cooperation, and assess progress on the goals outlined in paragraph 20.

23. We reiterate that our partnership on trade and technology takes place in full respect of the regulatory autonomy of the United States and European Union, and our respective institutional orders and frameworks.

Annexes

Enclosed are Annexes I-X that contain the shared conclusions per working group.
Conclusions on Working Group 1 - Technology Standards

1. Recalling the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021 and having consulted stakeholders, we are working together to develop approaches for coordination and cooperation in critical and emerging technology standards. In addition, a dedicated subgroup on Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) was established to advance work on specific deliverables, and ensure a coordinated approach on AI given its transversal character across several of the TTC working groups.

2. The U.S.-EU trade flows in many technology areas are significant. Having better aligned and interoperable technology standards would facilitate trading activities between companies considerably. While the U.S. and EU standardization systems are different, there is ongoing cooperation on pre standardization activities, as well as cooperation between U.S. and EU standardization development organizations.

3. Our shared intention is to foster the development of aligned and interoperable technical standards, and to reduce non-tariff barriers in key technology areas, and together leverage those at the international level.

Technology Standards Cooperation

4. The U.S.-EU cooperation in Working Group 1 has resulted in the establishment of a Strategic Standardisation Information (“SSI”) mechanism on international standards development with the aim to encourage engagement in new standardization opportunities and explore taking coordinated action if standardization activities pose a challenge to U.S.-EU strategic interests and values. The cooperation has been operationalized today through the signature of an administrative arrangement, designating dedicated U.S. and EU contact points.

5. Furthermore, we are making progress on concrete deliverables to ensure coordination and cooperation related to critical and emerging technology standards. The working group is discussing areas of strategic interest. In the areas of additive manufacturing and megawatt charging systems for heavy-duty recharging points, we have defined the scope of cooperation. Recycling of materials, digital identity and Internet of Things are additional areas of interest that we intend to explore for common possibilities for joint work. We aim to continue exploring these and other areas of strategic interest to come forward with a more comprehensive list of priority areas for cooperation by the end of 2022.

6. Finally, the working group intends to work together on strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises and potential non-industrial stakeholder participation in international standardization organizations and their access to standards, in coordination with Working Group 9. Actions identified in an exploratory discussion at an U.S.-EU stakeholder conference held on 6 May 2022 will be incorporated into existing workstreams or used to develop new workstreams, as appropriate.

Artificial Intelligence

7. We reaffirm our commitment to collaboration in developing and implementing trustworthy AI through a human-centered approach that reinforces shared democratic values and
respects human rights. We are jointly exploring how to implement existing AI principles and related efforts within our respective jurisdictions and policy and regulatory landscapes. Mutual understanding on this topic will help lay the foundation for future cooperation on AI initiatives.

8. To pave the way for further action, we intend to undertake the following steps:

   a. convening an expert exchange to advance the OECD AI Recommendation by providing information on the implementation of domestic AI initiatives, such as the EU AI Act, the AI-related rights in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, the U.S. AI Bill of Rights and the U.S. AI Risk Management Framework; and

   b. identifying additional potential areas for the United States and EU to work together to operationalize trustworthy AI.

9. We maintain that a risk-based approach to AI can enable trustworthy AI systems that enhance innovation, lower barriers to trade, bolster market competition, operationalize common values and protect the human rights and dignity of our citizens. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) has released the first draft of an AI Risk Management Framework based on feedback from industry, academia, and civil society, as well as a special publication on bias in AI. In the European Union, the European Commission proposal for a regulatory framework for AI contains dedicated requirements for AI trustworthiness and AI risk management. The requirements will be supported by harmonised standards developed by European Standardisation Organisations (“ESOs”). The ESOs have already started work related to a risk management and a unified approach to trustworthiness, taking into account relevant international standards. The European Commission, standardization experts and NIST have initiated cooperation concerning foundational elements related to measurement and evaluation tools, risk management and technical and socio-technical requirements for trustworthy AI.

10. We are working to develop a shared hub/repository of metrics and methodologies for measuring AI trustworthiness and AI risks. This can serve as a basis to promote further exchanges and discussions on measurement and evaluation tools and activities to assess the technical requirements for trustworthy AI and bias mitigation. We are working towards the development of interoperable approaches for managing AI risks. In conjunction with more trustworthy AI systems; such approaches can enable globally beneficial products and services. We intend to work on interoperable terminology related to technical characteristics such as robustness and accuracy, and on socio-technical characteristics including safety.

11. To these ends, and to support this work, we intend to develop a joint roadmap on evaluation and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management, which will feature perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders, including civil society, academia and the private sector. A draft will be shared at the next TTC Ministerial Meeting.

12. We acknowledge the importance of the work being conducted by standards development organizations. We are committed to coordinating as appropriate with those organizations to ensure that the necessary level of synergy is achieved and that any outcome produced under TTC could inform and be beneficial to their future work.

Annex I – Technology Standards
13. To advance ongoing analysis addressing the impact of AI on the workforce, U.S. and EU experts are preparing an economic study. This will feature a survey of previous literature on the subject, with attention to outcomes in employment, wages, and labor market opportunities. The document will also include two case studies: one, led by the United States, will deal with the use of AI in recruitment services, whereas the other, led by the European Union, will focus on AI in logistics and warehousing. The work will be grounded in quantitative data and supported, where possible and relevant, by interviews with experts and stakeholders.

14. Having discussed the maturity and potential of privacy-enhancing technologies (“PETs”), we intend to identify a common project utilising PETs to be launched by the next TTC Ministerial Meeting, which would be informed by a joint workshop.

15. Finally, in the Pittsburgh Statement on AI, we stated our opposition to rights-violating systems of social scoring. The European Commission has commissioned a survey to map the use and forms of social scoring worldwide, which will inform our development of a common understanding on social scoring systems, the risks they may pose, and possible mitigation steps.
Conclusions on Working Group 2 – Climate and Clean Tech

1. Since the Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) Ministerial Meeting in Pittsburgh, we have further advanced our work on specific initiatives to accelerate the deployment of clean, low carbon products and technologies that can help in achieving our common climate goal to reach net zero emissions by 2050 with a focus on three main areas: promoting green public procurement policies in line with the cooperation on procurement in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group, aligning methodologies for calculating the carbon footprint of selected products, and advancing electro-mobility and interoperability with smart grids.

Aims

2. The potential of green public procurement is still largely untapped. We aim to work towards a common understanding with a view to reaching consensus on sustainability considerations in government procurement procedures with a focus on green products and technologies, such as smart mobility and smart energy network technologies. The public sector, with its large procurement budgets and critical role in the provision of key public services, can be a trailblazer in the wide deployment of technologies that can help reduce CO2 emissions.

3. Lifecycle greenhouse gas (“GHG”) assessment methodologies, including carbon footprinting, are an increasingly important tool used by regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to identify and encourage the production and sale of low carbon products. We intend to explore work towards aligned approaches for such lifecycle assessment of products that can help track and reduce CO2 emissions and that can facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We also intend to explore the role that emerging technologies, such as blockchain, artificial intelligence/machine learning, and/or “internet of things”, can play in measuring and utilising lifecycle GHG assessments.

4. In response to the substantial expansion of the global market for electric vehicles, many initiatives are underway to build public and private charging infrastructures. We intend to work together on developing mutually shared operating requirements and validation methodologies for testing of e-vehicles with their charging columns. This work is critical to increasing the uptake of electro-mobility and promoting stable vehicle-to-grid integration across the U.S. and EU markets. Increased compatibility of electric vehicle charging infrastructure can help address emerging technical issues and support innovation in electro-mobility, and ultimately minimise trade barriers and strengthen U.S. and EU industries. Enabling the uptake of electro-mobility will contribute to diminish fossil fuel dependency and will help progress towards energy autonomy, in line with strategic priorities.

Deliverables

5. We have worked together on a series of first deliverables that lay the basis for concrete longer-term results. In green public procurement, we have started discussing a joint mapping of policies and a joint catalogue of best practices. Work in this area aims to accelerate the deployment of technologies that can measurably help reduce emissions and strengthen transatlantic trade.
6. In the area of lifecycle GHG assessment methodologies including carbon footprinting, we have begun expert-level exchanges on current practices and methodologies for selected products and supply chains. This work will help develop recommendations in areas that are most ripe for transatlantic convergence.

7. Experts are working together to develop a detailed workplan for the area of vehicle-to-grid integration. In addition, we have begun work at our research laboratories on establishing a digital link between electric vehicle smart-charging test-beds that will enable common real time research.

Next steps

8. By 2023-24, the working group aims to focus on accelerating the deployment of specific technologies that are critical to combatting climate change.

9. For electric vehicle charging, the working group will align technical guidelines for government-funded charging infrastructure that will support the roll-out of compatible charging technologies. This work will bring more certainty to public authorities and private investors, improve the quality of infrastructure and benefit society through increased electro-mobility.

10. For green public procurement policies, we intend to work towards a joint U.S.-EU initiative incorporating sustainability considerations in public procurement. This initiative would deepen the commonalities of our respective public procurement approaches with the aim of contributing to achieving our climate ambitions. This work could also inform discussions at the World Trade Organization on the Government Procurement Agreement as well as on the trade and sustainable development agenda.

11. In the area of lifecycle GHG assessment methodologies, including carbon footprinting, the objective is to work towards a common methodology for joint U.S.-EU recommendations on selected carbon-intensive products. This work can facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation and transatlantic convergence.

12. Our efforts in this working group should work to empower complementary private sector initiatives such as the First Movers Coalition\(^1\) and the Green Digital Coalition\(^2\) both with members from the United States and European Union. We also plan to cooperate on our respective initiatives to develop comprehensive digital models of the earth.

---

\(^1\) [First Movers Coalition](#)

\(^2\) [Green Digital Coalition](#)
Annex III

Conclusions on Working Group 3 – Secure Supply Chains

1. Recalling the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021 and having consulted stakeholders, we have jointly defined a work programme for the Working Group on Secure Supply Chains focused on clean energy, critical materials and pharmaceuticals. We have identified shared vulnerabilities of our respective solar panels supply chains in the attached TTC Statement on Solar Supply Chains and envisage to cooperate to address them. We recognize the need to advance transparency throughout the supply chain as a means to support the resilience of the sector and to promote sustainable business practices. We have identified shared risks in the rare earth magnets supply chain and have discussed our respective policy measures to mitigate them, as well as our research and development priorities. We are committed to avoiding unnecessary barriers to trade, which could negatively affect the other side’s production or export opportunities along this supply chain. We are continuing our respective analyses of the vulnerabilities of the critical medicines supply chain.

2. We intend to continue to work together on advancing the resilience of transatlantic supply chains in these key sectors for the green and digital transition, notably in light of the additional challenges created by the recent geopolitical instability. The focus will be on the principles for the design of policy interventions, and on strategies to reduce vulnerabilities, including via encouraging responsible sourcing of critical materials, to coordinate public investment approaches and to incentivize private investments and diversification of raw material processing capacity (e.g. lithium, nickel, cobalt). We also intend to cooperate on establishing common priorities in the field of research and development.

3. In addition, a dedicated workstream on semiconductors was established to advance work on specific deliverables in this area, with shared views being presented the attached TTC Statement on Semiconductors.

4. This Statement includes cooperation to diversify supply chains for rare earth magnets; advance transparency in and diversification of the solar supply chain; promote private sector efforts to increase transparency in the semiconductors value chain and in demand to anticipate shortages; enhance cooperation to provide early warning of semiconductor shortages; and to avoid subsidy races by advancing common goals for incentives granted in respective territories and an exchange of information regarding such incentives. We also welcome recent announcements of major investments to expand innovative semiconductor manufacturing in both the United States and European Union.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on Rare Earth Magnets

1. The Secure Supply Chains working group of the TTC has held exchanges since the TTC inaugural meeting in September 2021 in Pittsburgh to examine avenues for advancing transatlantic supply chain resilience and security of supply in key sectors. As part of the group’s initial focus on clean energy technology and critical materials, the working group members have shared views on supply chain mapping, vulnerabilities, and opportunities for collaboration on rare earth magnets.

Rare Earth Magnets Are Essential to the Transatlantic Economy and Climate Ambitions

2. Rare earth magnets have many uses across a broad spectrum of applications, including wind turbines, electric vehicle drives, hard disk drives, cell phones, loudspeakers, industrial motors, non-drive train motors in vehicles, power tools, and electric bikes. Under decarbonisation scenarios to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, demand for rare earth magnets is expected to grow rapidly, both in U.S. and EU domestic markets and globally. In the implementation of its objectives of a carbon pollution-free electric grid by 2035 and a net-zero economy by 2050, the U.S. government has established targets of offshore wind capacity installations of 30 GW by 2030 and 100 GW by 2050. The United States has further committed to electrify the federal government’s vehicle fleet and achieve a 50 percent share of electric vehicles for all new passenger cars and truck sales by 2030.

3. The EU strategy on offshore renewable energy proposes to increase Europe’s offshore wind capacity from its current level of 12 GW to at least 73 GW by 2030, which corresponds to the installation of 7 GW per year. Overall, EU wind energy is expected to grow from 180 GW today to 451 GW by 2030. The EU market is expected to reach about 7 million of electric vehicles by 2030.

4. These targets/proposals coupled with projected rapid private sector demand could place substantial stress on underdeveloped supply chains without capacity expansion at all supply chain stages, further market development, and investment.

5. Rare earth magnets, and the rare earth materials they contain, have been prone to substantial market volatility and supply risks due to the high geographical concentration of production and geopolitical factors. Companies from the United States and the European Union do not have prominent positions in the supply chain nor large scale magnets production and corresponding commercial scale magnet recycling capacity. Nearly all production stages are concentrated in China. Furthermore, processing rare earth elements in a sustainable manner requires proactive environmental risk mitigation controls, which not all countries and companies in the market are willing to invest in. Substitution is also difficult throughout the supply chain due to the unique characteristics and technical advantages of rare earth magnets.

Rare Earth Supply Chain Challenges

6. The Secure Supply Chain Working Group membership identified the following shared insights:

   a. geographical concentration of key stages of the supply chain: China accounted for nearly 60 percent of total rare earth mining production in 2020, an estimated 89 percent of total rare earth separation capacity, an estimated 90 percent of total metal refining...
capacity, and approximately 92 percent of global sintered Neodymium-iron-boron ("NdFeB") magnet manufacturing;

b. insufficient suppliers and domestic capacity in the United States and EU throughout the supply chain;

c. projected, rapid demand growth rate to meet net-zero emissions targets;

d. extreme market volatility;

e. limited substitutability of alternative materials and limitations to cost-efficient recycling; and

f. need for high environmental, social, and governance standards across the supply chain.

**Transatlantic Actions on Neodymium Magnet Supply Chains**

7. The U.S. Government is marshalling substantial resources to address these vulnerabilities and provide incentives for domestic production of rare earth magnets, including through resources provided under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021. It is providing funding to establish a rare earth demonstration facility to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of new technologies for a full-scale rare earth extraction, separation, and refining; to advance critical material innovation, efficiency, and alternatives; and to establish a Critical Minerals Supply Chain Research Facility. The United States has also awarded funding to establish domestic commercial scale processing and separation capabilities for rare earth elements.

8. The EU, through the Horizon Europe research and innovation programme, provides funding for mining, processing, separation and refining of rare earths and recycling of neodymium magnets. The European Raw Materials Alliance plans to develop a pipeline of investment projects along the rare earths and neodymium magnets value chain. The Alliance has come forward with 14 projects which could meet 20 percent of EU demand in rare earth magnets by 2030, compared to only a few percent today. The Clean Technology Materials Task Force brings together the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to accelerate investment in critical raw material projects in the investment pipelines.

9. We support private sector investments in the industry and actions to provide certainty of demand for diverse producers of neodymium magnets through, for example, definitive supply or offtake agreements between Original Equipment Manufacturers and producers.

10. We resolve to preserve the openness of the transatlantic supply chains. Both sides intend to take utmost care to avoid unnecessary barriers to trade barriers, which could negatively affect the other side’s production and trade opportunities in this supply chain.

**Future Collaboration**

11. To further enhance collaboration and coordinate policy actions, we are committed to redoubling and refocusing efforts through the TTC and other relevant multilateral initiatives, particularly partnerships to increase responsible investment for near-term rare earth elements project opportunities and the Conference on Critical Materials and Minerals between the European Union, the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada, to continue
to address rare earth elements supply chain vulnerabilities and to promote undistorted trade throughout the rare earth supply chain.

12. These enhanced efforts are focused on deeper research and development collaboration to unlock and maximize transatlantic mining production and processing capacity; improve characterization and utilization of unconventional resource extraction and processing (e.g. sourcing rare earths from by products and recycling streams); foster novel and effective recycling processes; support the development and adoption of standards for rare earth magnets and sustainable mining practices; and coordinate domestic initiatives that support trade and investments in the rare earth magnets supply chain. We intend to prioritize and advance projects of common strategic interest, leveraging respective diplomatic, project development, financing, and private industry resources.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on Solar Supply Chains

1. Over the past decade, solar power has evolved from an emerging, niche technology to a mature energy industry capable of playing a significant role in reaching a net zero economy by 2050, reducing energy costs, and bolstering energy security. According to scientific and industry analysis, solar photovoltaics (“PV”), the dominant form of solar energy, is now the cheapest source of new bulk power generation in countries that make up more than two-thirds of world population, 77 percent of global GDP and 91 percent of electricity generation.

2. The continued success of our global solar industry is a crucial issue both in the United States and the European Union. The most cost-effective paths to achieving a 100 percent carbon-free electricity grid by 2035 in the United States will require solar to generate 30-50 percent of U.S. electricity, up from three percent currently. In the European Union, the installed solar PV capacity needs to at least triple between 2020 and 2030 to be in line with EU’s climate goals (as proposed in July 2021). The REPowerEU communication of 8 March 2022 recognizes the key role of an accelerated solar deployment in decoupling from Russian gas imports.

3. The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) projects that achieving global net zero emissions by 2050 will require 630 GW of solar PV installed capacity to be added to the global electricity system per year until 2030, more than tripling of current deployment rates. These projections make clear that coordinating efforts to advance resiliency in solar supply chains is necessary to maintain solar energy’s central role in our energy security, energy cost, and climate objectives.

Solar Supply Chain Risks

4. Severe supply concentration and market bottlenecks in this sector pose energy security risks and create a significant vulnerability in light of the projected rapid growth in solar energy deployment necessary to meet transatlantic net-zero objectives. This unprecedented demand growth presents opportunities to diversify segments of the supply chain that are currently most commercially and geographically concentrated – namely the ingot, wafer, and cell manufacturing stages.

5. The United States and the European Union recognize the essential value of transparency of raw materials in the solar supply chain in ensuring sourcing from suppliers that uphold values consistent with our own, including protecting workers, and in striving for a more environmentally sustainable and climate friendly supply chain.

U.S. and EU Actions to Strengthen Solar Supply Chains

6. The United States and European Union are committed to taking proactive measures to improve solar supply chain resiliency and improve transparency in the production of silica-based goods and other relevant downstream products in solar supply chains. Since June 2021, the United States has taken a series of actions to advance resiliency in the solar supply chain, notably by supporting the development of alternative solar supply chains domestically and elsewhere via the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (“DFC”). This includes a recent debt financing announcement to construct manufacturing capacity in India. The United States also announced an advanced Solar Manufacturing Accelerator in President Biden’s Fiscal Year 2023 budget, which will support solar manufacturing in the
United States. The United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act that establishes a rebuttable presumption that any goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) are prohibited entry into the United States.

7. The European Union is developing an EU Solar Strategy planned for adoption in the spring of this year. It will outline a comprehensive plan for accelerating solar PV deployment and the strengthening of the European supply chain and overall resilience of the sector. In addition, the European Union has been developing initiatives that strengthen sustainability requirements in all supply chains in relation to companies operating in the Single Market. In this context, the European Commission published on 23 February 2022 a proposal for a Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence in all value chains and a Communication on decent work worldwide that announces the preparation of a new legislative instrument to effectively prohibit the placing on the EU market of products made by forced labor. This initiative will cover both domestic and imported products. The European Union also issued on 13 July 2021 guidelines on forced labor due diligence to help EU companies address the risk of forced labor in their operations and supply chains, in line with international standards. Finally, the European Union aims to adopt by the first half of 2023 Ecodesign and Energy labelling requirements for solar photovoltaic modules, inverters and systems.

Transatlantic Cooperation on Solar Supply Chains

8. The rapid expansion of solar energy has the potential to yield broad benefits in the form of global economic activity, job creation, and greenhouse gas emission reductions.

9. Through our respective processes, the United States and European Union intend to promote transparency in the solar supply chain. The United States and European Union recognize that traceability and due diligence can help create market demand for sustainable sources of supply for various solar technology components in the European Union, United States, and third countries, including by creating an economic incentive for investments in new capacity or in revitalizing currently idled capacity.

10. The United States and European Union likewise pledge to cooperate on respective project development and the design of financing tools and on bolstering solar manufacturing capacity that adheres to shared environmental, social, and quality standards and to alleviate existing supply chain concentration, actively working together to address market access barriers and distortions to U.S.-EU trade and investments, as U.S. and EU manufacturing capacity develops.

11. In the spirit of such positive cooperation, the United States and the European Union intend to work to minimise the impact of any protective measures on their respective industries and to leverage strengths of transatlantic suppliers in the solar supply chain.

12. Finally, the United States and the European Union are committed to continued coordination of policy measures, incentives, and other actions to catalyse the investments required to enable solar energy’s contributions to net-zero ambitions and to establish a more geographically and commercially diversified solar supply chain.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on Semiconductors

Common understanding on semiconductor shortages

1. Over the past two years, the United States, the European Union and other regions of the world have witnessed disruptions in semiconductors supply, causing shortages across multiple economic sectors with potentially serious societal and economic consequences.

2. The U.S.-EU TTC Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021 highlighted how shortages of certain semiconductors revealed the importance of ensuring stable, resilient and robust supply chains for these vital products. Semiconductor supply chains are global and highly interconnected with numerous choke points that can impact production.

3. We are mindful of the importance of ensuring security of supply through strengthened ecosystems and investments, as reflected by our respective proposed U.S. and EU Chips Acts.

4. Our common understanding is that disruptions in the supply chain resulted from multiple factors, described as a ‘perfect storm’ of factors. A surge in working from home, home schooling, and the use of digital entertainment throughout the COVID-19 pandemic led to increased demand for computers, electronics, and technology products. Shipments of chips increased by 40 percent from around 73 billion units in the first quarter of 2020 to approximately 102 billion units in the third quarter of 2021. Limited flexibility to increase supply in the short-term, as fabrication facilities were running at near full-capacity utilization, together with the use of zero-inventory approaches by user industries, did inhibit accommodation for the sudden increase in demand. Supply was also disrupted by a series of events, such as factory fires, winter storms, energy shortages, droughts and COVID-19-related shutdowns. This was compounded by dislocations in global logistics, transportation networks and shortages of raw materials and intermediary products.

5. We have identified semiconductors shortages having affected certain chips and applications, in particular legacy logic chips, analogue chips and optoelectronic chips, as well as the supply of substrates and raw materials, used in critical industries and economic sectors including automotive, healthcare, industrial automation, communications and energy.

6. We share the view that a persistent mismatch of demand and supply is not expected to abate in the near-term mainly due to the main bottleneck of additional production capacity, but also as a result of constraints for sourcing materials and in assembly, test, and packaging capacity.

7. To address these issues, we intend to take action to increase transparency and monitoring of the value chain, set up an alert system to share information about possible disruptions, and incentivize increased production while avoiding subsidy races.

Increasing transparency in the value chain

8. We underline that promoting supply chain transparency, in partnership with industry and all relevant stakeholders, is essential to our ability to anticipate shortages and mitigate their negative effects. We are also mindful that certain practices, such as overbooking, have a harmful effect on the entire supply chain.
9. For that purpose, we are committed to working with industry to promote initiatives aimed at advancing transparency regarding demand for semiconductors, in order to help inform future investments, separately, to create a marketplace for semiconductors in short supply in order to help and alleviate bottlenecks in the supply chain. Concretely, we intend support such industry-led initiatives and strive to undertake a common project for promoting demand transparency. A dedicated workshop with stakeholders already engaged or interested in these initiatives is expected to take place before the summer to build further momentum and to discuss perspectives to advance the objectives and the next steps.

10. We share the understanding that anticipation in identifying disruption problems in the supply chain is key for mitigating their impact. We recognize that certain measures, such as requesting information from stakeholders for monitoring the supply chain, can assist in mitigating the effect of supply chain disruptions, while protecting business confidential information.

Setting up an early warning mechanism

11. We intend to develop a common early warning and monitoring mechanism of the value chain and, as foreseen in the proposed EU Chips Act, to exchanging information between ourselves with a view to seeking cooperative solutions to supply chain disruptions.

12. U.S. government agencies and the European Commission and intend to participate in a two-months pilot to develop an early warning system for semiconductor supply chain disruptions:
   a. Meetings would be scheduled to take place once every two weeks to discuss potential risks.
   b. Ad-hoc meetings could be organized in case of unexpected scenarios.
   c. Discussions would be informed through information gathered independently, still protecting confidentiality of business proprietary and sensitive information.
   d. At the end of the pilot, chairs may make recommendations for a permanent framework.

Incentive structures

13. We share the view that semiconductors are a critical input for a wide range of important economic, national security, scientific, and communications applications, where significant investments are needed, in particular in production capacity, but also in design, assembly and testing, as well as workforce development, to avoid disruptions in the future. These investments should encompass technological advances in computing power, energy efficiency or other innovations such as in materials and processes.

14. As highlighted in Pittsburgh, we recognize that subsidy races must be avoided. We are determined to provide any support for this sector in line with WTO rules.

15. In addition, we share the common goal to limit subsidies to what is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to achieve public policy objectives. To this end, we intend to operationalize this goal in implementing our respective polices.
a. The European Commission through the proposed EU Chips Act package, explained how it intends to assess the use of public funding for semi-conductors in the EU. The European Commission will take into account in its State Aid assessment that new production facilities are first-of-a-kind in the EU, that there is a commitment to invest in the next generation of technology and that such facilities contribute to the security of supply of the EU.

b. The United States Congress has authorized a set of programs known as Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America (“CHIPS Act”) as part of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) for Fiscal Year 2021, with funding authorized to the U.S. Department of Commerce and other agencies to provide financial incentives and other supports as appropriate. In providing such incentives, the U.S. Department of Commerce will seek to take into account in its assessment the extent to which proposed investments demonstrate economic viability, improve the security and assuredness of the microelectronics supply chain, enable continued innovation and technological leadership, and provide support for beneficial community and workforce development investments, aligned with national strategic objectives.

16. Consistent with core World Trade Organization principles, we intend to provide each other the following information for subsidies granted or maintained in our territories with the exception of business confidential information or other protected information under applicable law:

   a. the purpose of the subsidy;
   b. the form of the subsidy;
   c. the amount of the subsidy or the amount budgeted for the subsidy; and
   d. if possible, the name of the recipient of the subsidy.

17. In addition, reciprocal consultation at principals’ level will be important in case of alerts to subsidy races. A mechanism is to be put in place to that effect.

R&D and workforce investments

18. We share the common goal of the United States and European Union Member States investing in public semiconductor R&D to fill gaps in the innovation ecosystem and meeting workforce needs necessary to sustain our competitiveness across the semiconductor supply chain.
Annex IV

Conclusions on Working Group 4 – ICTS Security and Competitiveness

Introduction

1. In the summit statement released at the Pittsburgh ministerial meeting, the Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) co-chairs tasked Working Group Four with exploring concrete cooperation on public finance for secure and resilient digital connectivity in third countries; reinforcing cooperation on research and innovation for beyond 5G and 6G systems; developing a common vision and roadmap for preparing the next generation of communication technologies towards 6G; and discussing data security.

2. Since then, we have further advanced work on a number of deliverables. These include concluding a Joint Statement on the importance of addressing security risks from high-risk vendors and fostering security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the information and communications technology and services (“ICTS”) supply chain; setting up a taskforce to collaborate on public financing for information and communications technology (“ICT”) projects in third countries; working to develop a common vision on research and development beyond 5G and 6G, and preparing to co-host a virtual stakeholder engagement meeting.

Deliverables

3. We have a shared perspective on the importance of addressing security risks from high-risk vendors and fostering security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the ICTS supply chain.

4. In the area of collaborating on public ICT financing, we have established a taskforce to identify and discuss practical application of existing criteria and standards for promoting use of trustworthy/non-high-risk suppliers for ICT projects in third countries, and to collaborate on joint U.S.-EU public financing for ICT projects in third countries. We intend to increase collaboration with public funding bodies, development finance banks (including multilateral development banks) and, as appropriate, EU Member State export credit agencies, to achieve these aims.

Next steps

5. In the area of joint stakeholder engagement, we intend to co-host a virtual meeting for Working Group 4 in June 2022.

6. In the area of cooperation on research and development beyond 5G and 6G, we propose to work towards a common vision and roadmap outlining some of the key challenges and needs of future generations of communication technologies, including 6G. This could include technology requirements based on future use case categories, trusted connectivity in the context of next generation networks, spectrum issues, standardization of security and interoperability standards, as well as large-scale testing and experimentation. The partnerships currently set up in the EU (Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking) and United States (ATIS-NextG Alliance/RINGS) could cooperate to advance this effort.

7. Moving forward, we plan to work on other elements of cooperation, including an
information exchange on securing ICTS supply chains and risk information sharing programmes and exchanges on respective approaches to data security.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on the Importance of Security, Diversity, Interoperability, and Resilience for Information and Communications Technology and Services

1. This statement lays out our shared vision for the importance of addressing security risks from high-risk suppliers and fostering security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the ICTS supply chain. In addition, this statement outlines the ways in which we can collectively work together to achieve our shared vision through the Working Group on ICTS Security and Competitiveness. This includes, notably, a dedicated TTC taskforce on public financing for secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains, preparations to host a joint stakeholder engagement event in June, and an exchange on 6G research and innovation initiatives in the United States and the European Union.

2. The COVID-19 crisis has underscored the importance of ensuring that all citizens have secure, resilient access to the Internet to fully participate in economic, political, social, and cultural life. Furthermore, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the importance of secure, trusted, and resilient ICTS to our national security and sovereignty. We therefore reaffirm our ambition in the 2021 G7 Final Communique to promote secure, resilient, competitive, transparent and sustainable and diverse digital, telecoms, and ICT infrastructure supply chains. This requires a rigorous and risk-based evaluation of equipment, software, and services suppliers, consistent with existing measures such as those set out in the EU’s 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the U.S. Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. Building on this shared understanding, we intend to share information on our individual approaches to the security of sensitive and critical areas of the ICTS supply chain, including steps we are taking to restrict the use of high-risk suppliers. Our focus is based on a comprehensive and holistic view of global ICTS supply chains and sensitive and critical areas of ICTS networks, including 5G, undersea cables, data centers, and cloud infrastructure. We are committed to working together to encourage our allies and partners to undertake similar security measures to protect their infrastructures and services, through bilateral and multilateral fora.

3. The United States and EU plan to support partners in developing secure digital infrastructure that underpins their economic prosperity, bridges the digital divide and meets their development needs. Such investments will be based on the principles of good governance, transparency, accountability and financial sustainability. We intend to support trusted connectivity that is resilient in the face of cyber or hybrid threats, unwarranted surveillance or economic coercion for geopolitical aims. Investments will be linked to standards and protocols that support network security, interoperability and the open Internet.

4. In support of these goals, we have launched a dedicated taskforce on joint U.S.-EU public financing for secure and resilient connectivity and ICTS supply chains in third countries as part of Working Group 4. This taskforce will promote the use of trusted/non-high-risk suppliers in third countries; share information on our respective efforts to support secure, resilient, and rights-respecting ICTS projects in third countries; and operationalize the principles below to ensure ICTS projects are secure, resilient, and trusted. The taskforce will also have the objective of undertaking joint projects, and strengthening our ability to provide the financing that our partner governments need to improve their ICTS infrastructure and provide secure, trusted digital services to their citizens, in a technology neutral way. This task force’s efforts will support U.S. and EU flagship infrastructure
initiatives, to advance and prioritize high-quality ICTS infrastructure projects that promote the following overarching principles:

a. Support an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet,

b. Refrain from financing purchases from untrusted/high-risk suppliers,

c. Advance competition in the provision of quality ICT services,

d. Enable human centric connectivity,

e. Bridge the digital divide for all,

f. Respect democratic values, and human rights

g. Rely on good governance and transparency principles and,

h. Use sound cybersecurity policies and frameworks.

5. Ensuring security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the ICTS supply chain requires a digital ecosystem that is secure, based on open and transparent standards, innovative and competitive. We intend to discuss market trends towards open, interoperable approaches alongside the continued importance of trusted, established architectures. As governments, we continue to take a principles-based, technology-neutral approach to ensure competitiveness and strengthen innovation and technology development in general. As such, we plan to share information on our respective approaches in this regard, including discussing how governments can contribute to enhancing security, performance, energy efficiency, and interoperability of such open, interoperable approaches through research and development funding and support for global and transparent standards development in line with the World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.

6. We share an understanding that our approach to security needs to address all of the layers and elements of the ICTS supply chain, from the physical to application layers, from microelectronics components to networks to cloud infrastructures and services. This is the fundamental understanding on which we base our efforts to ensure the security of individuals’ and our industrial and machine-generated data. We expect to share information with each other on our respective efforts in this regard and to undertake discussions with the private sector, academia, consumers, and other stakeholders with the aim of building a better understanding of the current threats to data security and what government policies are needed to address these threats.

7. Next-generation connectivity technologies beyond 5G and towards 6G are expected to be the basis for our digital services by 2030, which will become even more critical for our societies. We have the common aim to ensure that these technologies will have the capability to enable the use cases of the future, but will also be designed based on our common key principles and values such as security, privacy, openness, interoperability, accessibility, sustainability, etc. To this end, we resolve to continue exchanging information on our respective 6G initiatives and work towards the development of joint roadmaps and the identification of specific areas of cooperation.

8. All of our joint work will be underpinned by frequent and meaningful consultation with a
broad and diverse range of stakeholders. In this regard, we expect to hold a joint stakeholder engagement meeting in June.
Annex V

Conclusions on Working Group 5 – Data Governance and Technology Platforms

1. As part of the Data Governance and Technology Platforms Working Group, we intend to cooperate on our shared concerns regarding the spread of illegal and harmful conduct and content on online platforms. We affirm that online platforms, commensurate with their impacts on society, should exercise greater responsibility in ensuring that their services contribute to an online environment that respects human rights and democratic values and is not harmful, especially with regard to minors.

2. In our initial collaboration, we have focused on transparency of content moderation, algorithmic amplification, and data access for researchers. These topics are crucial in helping citizens, civil society, industry, governments, and other stakeholders deepen their common understanding on how platforms shape the information environment, a shared concern in the U.S. and EU, and at the heart of U.S. policy and the EU’s Digital Services Act.

3. In light of this, we have reached a shared understanding on these particular issues and the Working Group proposes to follow up on a number of concrete actions:

   a. **Transparency and responsiveness in content moderation.** Platforms’ terms of service and their content-moderation practices are important part of tackling illegal and harmful conduct and content. There is a shared view that meaningful transparency and responsiveness have the power to increase trust and accountability of platforms’ content moderation practices. Drawing on our respective frameworks, we intend to work together to either encourage or require online platforms to:

      i. publish transparent and clear terms of service;

      ii. provide a complaint or flagging system to notify online platforms of potentially policy-violating content, illegal content, or illegal activity and act promptly on such notifications; and

      iii. use meaningful metrics for reporting on the activity of content moderation systems.

   In parallel, we expect to work towards promoting the sharing of industry best practices and guidelines for transparency reporting by providers of online platforms, which should be informed by, but not interfere with, ongoing efforts.

   b. **Algorithmic Amplification.** We have a shared concern about the potential risks posed by algorithmic amplification, particularly in the uncontrolled spread of illegal and harmful content on online platforms, which may be driven by perverse incentives to attract more viewing. Independent scrutiny of, and oversight over, the effects of algorithmic amplification has been limited, in part because of constraints related to meaningful access to data. This prevents civil society, researchers, users and governments, and possibly online platforms themselves, from understanding risks and developing effective mitigation measures. We intend to continue our collaboration to
deepen our understanding of algorithmic amplification and its effect on society, as well as meaningful response measures.

c. **Data access for researchers.** Researchers are essential to the proper understanding of the evolution of online risks, particularly those related to illegal content and harmful content on online platforms. This work critically depends on access to data from online platforms, which is currently hindered by information asymmetries and a dependence on voluntary mechanisms for data sharing. Online platforms should be forward leaning in sharing data with researchers. We share the view on the importance of facilitating data and information sharing with researchers by consumer-facing platforms with appropriate safeguards for data privacy and security. Information sharing should build upon existing legal frameworks and not interfere with, ongoing efforts and specific reporting and monitoring requirements. We intend to advance modalities for data access for researchers to enable online platforms to grant such access with a view to advancing the common understanding of the societal risks applicable to specific online platforms, while ensuring appropriate security and respect for privacy. Such data access would also have benefits for partner countries.

4. As a next step, we intend to convene a workshop on the importance of promoting freedom of expression and to discuss relevant underlying legal frameworks in the United States and European Union as well as existing public and private practices such as voluntary industry collaboration to address incitement to violence and hatred while respecting all users’ rights.

5. On the protection of minors online, we have a shared concern about the impact of online platforms on minors’ mental health, well-being and development, in particular, through the collection of data and algorithmic targeting techniques. We intend to exchange our mutual experience on this priority topic as part of this Working Group going forward. The discussion will cover specifically bans for online platforms on collecting important amounts of data on minors and targeting advertising towards minors. This would be informed by a joint U.S.-EU policy workshop on policy design methods that strongly involve young citizens. We intend to exchange best practices to ensure that digital policy continues to reflect the perspectives of all generations, including minors. Going beyond the immediate priority of making sure minors and children are protected online, the United States and the European Union also recognize the need to promote a positive environment online that is designed with minors and children in mind and that actively fosters their well-being and opportunities.

6. In the longer term, the aim is to establish a structured policy dialogue dedicated to key emerging issues in platform governance, including competition in digital markets, in order to find common ground on the scope of the challenges, to seek greater consistency where feasible in policy and regulatory approaches and to coordinate on enforcement (including on the contestability and fairness of the online platform economy). The policy dialogue would also be a forum for joint communication on common principles and crisis situations.

7. We have already advanced on the common initiative on a global Declaration for the Future of the Internet, based on a human-centric approach. We are deeply concerned about the repression of Internet freedom by some authoritarian governments, the use of digital tools to deny human rights, the growing impacts of cyberattacks, the spread of illegal and harmful content, including information manipulation and the excessive concentration of economic power. We are therefore committed to working in close cooperation together with partner countries to address these developments and risks through a commitment to
principles articulated in the Declaration for the Future of the Internet. As partners in the Declaration, we affirm that the Internet must reinforce core democratic principles, human rights, and fundamental freedoms as reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We launched the Declaration on 28 April 2022.

8. As with the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, we strive to the broadest degree of convergence on data governance and platforms. We intend to continue to deepen our cooperation including through the proposed frameworks, workshops and exchanges. We resolve to seek global alignment precisely to ensure that citizens and businesses benefit from a safe, fair, and contestable online environment.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on Cooperation Framework on Information Integrity in a Crisis

1. The United States and EU share the view that defending the integrity of information, ensuring access to fact-based information for the global community, and mitigating the risks of foreign state-sponsored actions to manipulate and censor information requires enhanced coordination in times of crisis. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has demonstrated the dangerous impact foreign information manipulation and interference – including through online platforms and offline threats and other chilling actions – can have, in particular, on transparent and accessible information.

2. United by a common commitment to deepen cooperation on addressing the data governance and platform governance aspects to a crisis, the EU and the United States propose establishing a standing policy dialogue to: explore cooperation on protecting the digital information space in a crisis; leverage joint capabilities to identify specific digital risks and, as appropriate, exchange information; and cooperate on crisis responses to online platforms and online platform governance; and exploring practical options available to governments for consideration in crisis situations, such as funding, digital and support services that promote access to trustworthy and fact-based information. Online platforms are essential actors in mitigating the risks and increasing digital protections for targeted individuals and groups. The U.S.-EU cooperation mechanism would also strengthen bilateral coordination and support ongoing work in other working groups and in other multilateral mechanisms.

3. Immediate opportunities for action will include addressing ongoing challenges in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, such as assessing the impact of government and non-government efforts to date to protect the digital information ecosystem and identifying future risks, and, as appropriate, coordinated outreach to platforms in furtherance of efforts to further protect the digital information ecosystem. In particular, our cooperation will endeavour to address the spread of disinformation in third countries regarding the causes for disruption of global food supplies. Any resulting efforts from the dialogue should be complementary to existing frameworks and initiatives, including the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism.

4. As a first step, we intend to set up a crisis response framework to address online challenges to information integrity in the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine involving both the United States and the European Union as part of the Trade and Technology Council. In addition, we resolve to elaborate a set of best practices in cooperation with relevant stakeholders to address future digital threats around the globe, that are resulting from, or inspired by, Russia’s aggression. In the event of future crises, the United States and the European Union could trigger the framework together and it could potentially be broadened to include other partners.
Conclusions on Working Group 6 – Misuse of Technology Threatening Security and Human Rights

1. The aim of this working group is to combat arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, work to protect human rights defenders against online threats, explore building effective mechanism to respond to Internet shutdowns and increase transatlantic cooperation to address information manipulation while upholding freedom of expression and privacy rights.

2. Russia’s further aggression against Ukraine was premeditated and has led to some of the gravest violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of international human rights law on the European continent in over 70 years. These recent developments underline the importance of our close collaboration on countering the systematic use of such activities by Russia as well as protecting human rights defenders against online threats; combating internet shutdowns and network disruptions; and responding to arbitrary or unlawful surveillance.

3. For this purpose, the working group operates in four different work strands to further reinforce collaboration and make progress on each priority goals. We intend to engage multilaterally, including with and within the United Nations, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”) and UN Special Procedures, as well as other stakeholders:
   a. *Combatting arbitrary or unlawful surveillance*: To strengthen the global awareness of jurisdictions’ obligations to refrain from the arbitrary or unlawful use of surveillance products or services and to promote businesses’ respect for human rights, focused on companies that engage in transactions with products or services with surveillance capabilities.
   b. *Protecting human rights defenders online*: To identify and mitigate online threats faced by human rights defenders, including harassment, smear campaigns, and censorship, and their impacts offline; to raise global awareness to the threats; to reaffirm our joint commitment to protecting defenders online; and to broaden global support.
   c. *Responding to Internet shutdowns*: To leverage technical and diplomatic coordination to bring high-level attention to the issue of Internet shutdowns, in particular to their local and international impacts, in order to effectively stop an alarming trend. To increase attention to this issue at multilateral fora, and to strengthen our collective expertise and collaboration with the multi-stakeholder community.
   d. *Addressing state-sponsored information manipulation and interference*. To deepen joint U.S.-EU efforts to more effectively identify, analyze, and counter information manipulation by foreign state actors.

4. We share the view that all jurisdictions should implement legislation and safeguards to
protect people from arbitrary or unlawful surveillance. Deeply concerned about the global spread of State-imposed systems of surveillance, we jointly recall that such policies have to be fully in line with international human rights law. The U.S. and EU also reaffirm support for use of our respective human rights due diligence guidance tools.

5. Through consultation with stakeholders, we intend to examine how to better promote State responsibilities to limit the arbitrary or otherwise unlawful use of surveillance products or services and promote respect for human rights among business actors, including those engaged in transactions of products or services with surveillance capabilities. We also intend to engage multilaterally, including at the UN, and with the private sector to highlight best practice in due diligence and incentives for the respect of human rights.

**Human Rights Defenders Online**

6. We affirm that it is of utmost importance to protect human rights defenders from online threats, many of which can impact them offline, including smear campaigns, harassment, surveillance, censorship, and to protect freedom of association and peaceful assembly online. We expect to continue leveraging our joint expertise to identify and mitigate threats faced by human rights defenders online.

7. Building on existing cooperation within the Trade and Technology Council ("TTC") framework, we co-hosted a side-event at the 49th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, partnering also with Costa Rica and international NGOs. The event focused on threats faced by women human rights defenders and included key recommendations for governments. Our efforts involved close coordination with civil society and the United Nations.

8. Going forward, we intend to work to develop policies to mitigate threats to democracy and human rights online, including through working with the business community. We also intend to organize expert exchanges to foster the exchange of lessons learned and further improve coordination regarding emergency protection of human rights defenders. We intend to call on likeminded countries to amplify their support for defenders, and plan to issue a joint public statement on current challenges.

**Internet Shutdowns**

9. We affirm the importance of protecting and promoting an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet, one that is unfragmented, and governed by a multi-stakeholder model. This facilitates the enjoyment of human rights, economic opportunity, and global exchange of ideas. We recognize that the Internet and digital technologies can contribute to the timely documentation of human rights and international humanitarian law violations as well as access to life-saving information in emergencies and armed conflict. We are acutely concerned by the increasing use of full scale or targeted Internet shutdowns, blackouts of connectivity, or intentional network slowdowns, we jointly condemn government-imposed Internet shutdowns or degradation of domestic Internet access and raise attention to the broad negative effects of such measures.

10. Going forward, we intend to pursue joint research together with the multi-stakeholder community on the effects of shutdowns both locally and internationally. We are ready to play our parts in building an effective mechanism to respond to government-imposed Internet shutdowns or degradation of domestic Internet access. We also intend to work
together in the framework of other international fora, and are committed to undertaking diplomatic outreach to governments that impose Internet shutdowns.

**Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference**

11. We acknowledge that state-sponsored information manipulation and interference are a key threat to our respective democracies, societies, and security. Recent events in the context of Russia’s further aggression against Ukraine have confirmed once again the gravity of the threat and the importance of tackling it together. Building on existing strong cooperation, we have made progress in the TTC to further align our frameworks and approaches.

12. Going forward, we intend to advance the development of a common or comparable understanding of and methodology for identifying foreign information manipulation and interference, as well as for cataloguing it and sharing related information. This is also expected to entail the creation of a common directory, drawing upon open sources, to catalogue Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (“TTPs”) used to conduct information manipulation and interference. To facilitate further steps, we plan to organize an analyst conference.

13. We also plan to bring together social and political science researchers in the U.S. and EU to discuss the latest research on the underlying causes and impact of foreign information manipulation interference. Other exchanges between relevant stakeholders on specific topics of common concern relating to information manipulation and disinformation are expected to be organized.

14. We intend, in compliance with our respective legal frameworks, to foster an increase in the sharing of privacy-compliant information related to foreign information manipulation and interference and scope joint activity and responses between the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (“RRM”) and the EU Rapid Alert System (“RAS”). We also plan to explore the possibility of privacy compliant U.S.-EU information exchange to facilitate potential attribution of foreign information manipulation and interference, in compliance with our respective legal frameworks.
Trade and Technology Council Statement on Network Restrictions in the Context of Russia’s War of Further Aggression Against Ukraine

1. The United States and European Union strongly condemn the Russian government’s actions to partially shut down or degrade Internet connectivity in Ukraine. We further condemn the Russian government’s actions to prevent the people of Russia from accessing social media platforms, numerous Russian and international news sites, and certain mobile applications. By blocking access to information and by spreading disinformation, Russia continues an all-out assault on the truth, to obscure war crimes and other atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine, which are being documented in horrifying images and reports of torture, rape, and the execution of civilians.

2. A vibrant civic space can only thrive if all human rights are protected online and offline. Internet shutdowns, blocking or filtering of services and rerouting Internet traffic for political motives pose a fundamental threat to human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and association and freedom of expression, which form the basis of a democratic society. The threat is especially salient when shutdowns lack procedural fairness and transparency. Internet shutdowns impact all users, especially marginalized groups and those in vulnerable situations. Shutdowns limit media freedom and the ability of journalists and human rights defenders to collect evidence of and report on human rights and international humanitarian law violations (including indiscriminate attacks against civilians) and to hold governments accountable. Shutdowns and restrictions also limit the dissemination and free flow of information, harm economic activity, contribute to social and political disorder, and negatively affect public safety. In conjunction with restrictive measures and intimidation of civil society members, including human rights defenders, and journalists, Russia’s actions to limit access to the Internet, including social media and other digital communication platforms, further erode civic space.

3. Attacks on Internet and telecommunications infrastructure likewise decrease access to the Internet and the delivery of independent and life-saving information, communication and services that it enables.

4. Restricted access to information and censorship are expanding the space for foreign state-sponsored information manipulation to thrive, causing a significant negative impact during this conflict. Specific Russian measures imposing heavy criminal liability for reporting the truth about the war of aggression against Ukraine further aggravate the situation. The Russian government’s coordinated disinformation campaign has conjured false and misleading narratives intended to sow confusion about the facts of the invasion, seed division, and erode trust in democracy. It has enabled and continues to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Foreign state-sponsored information manipulation and interference campaigns undermine peace, prosperity and individual freedoms, and they threaten the rules-based international system.
5. All people deserve access to diverse and reliable sources of news and information so that members of society can form opinions, hold governments and individuals to account, and participate in public debate. These freedoms are foundational to a healthy democracy.

6. We stand with the people of Ukraine and Russia who are making their voices heard despite these oppressive measures, including human rights defenders, independent journalists, and peaceful protestors, reaffirming that in order to meaningfully participate in social and political life online and offline, societies must be free from oppressive practices such as state-sponsored information manipulation and interference.

7. We urge all stakeholders to take active steps to address foreign state-led information manipulation and interference in a manner that respects human rights, democratic governance, and the rule of law.
Conclusions on Working Group 7 – Export Controls

Introduction

1. Following the Pittsburgh Ministerial Meeting and in light of principles for our cooperation on export control as stated in the Annex II to the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021, we have started to deliver concrete results and defined priorities for the work programme in consultation with stakeholders.³

2. Through supporting and strengthening the multi-lateral approach to export controls and the work of the non-proliferation regimes, our common approach will ensure that the application of export controls is transparent and equitable for U.S. and EU exporters, and will deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations based on our shared democratic values.

3. In addition, as a concrete expression of the TTC’s process, we have deeply enhanced our cooperation on our respective export restrictions in regard to trade with Russia and Belarus in response to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. The restrictive measures, imposed in record time, demonstrates the added value of close cooperation between the United States and the European Union.

Results achieved so far

4. We consolidated a work programme for the Export Control Working Group in January 2022, identifying actions to promote bilateral trade, joint innovation and technology development through discussions on our respective dual-use export control practices, to address security concerns associated with sensitive and emerging technologies and destinations of concern, and to cooperate on capacity building assistance to third countries, starting in the Western Balkans.

Russia and Belarus

5. We have held intensive prior consultations, in close cooperation with other partners, in the shaping of a robust response to Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine. As a result of these consultations, we have restricted trade with Russia and Belarus and adopted unprecedented comparable sanctions that limit exports of dual-use items and strategic technologies that undermine Russia’s capacity to acquire the technologies for continuing its war against Ukraine. As part of the export restrictions, we now jointly prohibit, in particular, with limited exceptions, exports to Russia and Belarus of:

   a. dual-use items – those controlled by the multilateral export control regimes;

   b. advanced technology items not multilaterally controlled which have potential military application, in categories including electronics, telecommunication,

information security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics, marine, and aerospace; and

c. items for military end-users and entities supporting Russia's military-industrial complex.

While aiming to have significant and severe impact in particular against Russia and Belarus’s defense sector, these restrictions were carefully tailored to mitigate the impacts on U.S. and EU global trade.

The process was facilitated on the margins of the Export Control Working Group, in particular with regard to the technical aspects of the export restrictions. The United States and the European Union should now continue to facilitate their implementation and further developments. Building on this cooperation we expect to work together with other partners and third countries on export controls in a joint and structured effort to uphold international peace and security and to enhance our capacity of countering risks of circumvention.

6. This common approach is consistent with the TTC’s objectives – as specified in Annex II to the Joint Statement following the Pittsburgh Ministerial meeting – to coordinate on key global trade, economic, and technology issues, to engage in technical consultations on upcoming legislative and regulatory developments that effect the United States and EU.

7. The unprecedented level of cooperation we have achieved on Russia and Belarus is indicative of the shared values and security objectives and serves as a reference for common approaches in other areas of export controls.

8. Going forward, the Export Control Working Group provides a structured and systematic forum for the United States and the EU for further work on export restrictions and sanctions – on controlled items on the basis of reciprocity including technical consultations and implementation actions alongside other countries, in order maximize their impact. To this purpose, the Export Control Working Group intends to continue to regularly exchange pertinent information, with an initial focus on Russia and other potential sanctions evaders.

**Licensing**

9. We are exploring ways to promote bilateral trade, joint innovation and technology development, particularly across key technology sectors, while ensuring that U.S. and EU technologies will be protected from external misuse. To facilitate this, the Export Control Working Group seeks to consider how we can:

   a. work towards a better understanding of the administrative process to grant licenses for re-export of certain goods originating in our respective territories, in order to identify possible improvements on the basis of reciprocity; and

   b. support further common approaches in the update of our control lists, in line with decisions of multilateral export control regimes, with a view to ensuring that control lists for dual use export control are consistently implemented.

10. In line with the commitment to consult on sensitive dual use technologies, the Export Control Working Group plans to exchange information on risk assessment and licensing good practices, such as the EU’s guidelines on exports of dual-use items and the ongoing
Export Control and Human Rights Initiative announced at the U.S. Summit for Democracy in December 2021 in which several EU Member States are already taking part.

11. The Export Control Working Group intends to evaluate licensing good practices for key technology sectors, including, but not limited to semi-conductors, by the next TTC meeting.

**Emerging Technologies**

12. Taking into consideration the fast pace of innovation and quickly evolving technologies, with the need to maintain a level playing field, the Export Control Working Group expects to exchange information on risk assessments, awareness raising, licensing policies and their implementation, with a view to exploring appropriate multilateral controls in order to work towards a broad response to the identified risks.

**Regulation and Practice**

13. The Export Control Working Group also plans to exchange on export control implementation to better coordinate U.S. and EU practices regarding licensing, including cooperation on control lists’ updates, taking into account decisions of multilateral export control regimes.

14. The Export Control Working Group will evaluate technical assistance requests from third countries to support effective export control implementation. The Working Group expects to leverage available U.S. and EU tools, resources, and training to support export control capacities of third countries.
Annex VIII

Conclusions on Working Group 8 – Investment Screening

1. In line with the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021, including its Annex I and building on the existing cooperation, our focus in Working Group 8 has confirmed the importance of maintaining robust investment screening mechanisms throughout the United States and EU in order to address risks to national security and, within the EU, public order, while remaining open to foreign investment.

2. We recognize the importance of international engagement on investment security issues to address transnational risks and maintain collective security. We continue to affirm our commitment to open foreign investment, which is essential for economic growth and innovation. We recognize the significant investment linking companies on both sides of the Atlantic, which illustrates the strength of the transatlantic partnership.

3. The United States and the European Union have a shared view on the importance of establishing fully-fledged foreign investment screening mechanisms within their territories and beyond, and for those mechanisms to cover all relevant transactions. They recognize the importance of the cooperation between the United States and the European Union supporting the development of such mechanisms, the importance of which is highlighted by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

4. The cooperation has resulted in the adoption of a work programme aimed at improving the understanding of our respective investment screening regime, the evolving threats related to certain foreign investments, and a very useful sharing of best practices for the identification of vulnerabilities in sensitive sectors.

5. To date, the Investment Screening Working Group has discussed investment trends affecting security. Exchanges focused on overall foreign direct investment trends, trends in investments and strategies from certain countries of origin, including Russia, and trends with respect to transaction structures of interest, and an overview of implementation of its screening regimes based on aggregated information available in our respective public reports.

6. Working Group 8 has also had an exchange on best practices, focused on sensitive technologies and sensitive data issues, and presentations of case studies facilitating more focused discussion with respect to risk analysis and risk mitigating measures.

7. The focus of the exchanges is not only to share information, but to better understand similarities and differences, deepen collective understanding of shared and individual risks, emphasize the importance of investment screening as one of the key tools to address national security and public order risks, and explore potential opportunities for deeper technical exchanges for increasingly efficient future collaboration.

8. In line with the U.S.-EU TTC Inaugural Joint Statement of 29 September 2021, Working Group 8 is engaging with stakeholders to gain their perspectives and input to help inform the working group’s efforts. The first outreach event on 2 December 2021 featured updates from the United States and the European Union regarding the overall principles and goals of the TTC and the objectives of Working Group 8 and regarding recent regulatory
developments. Stakeholders provided valuable input throughout the discussion and in their written submissions, which the U.S. and EU noted to take into consideration.

9. Moving forward, Working Group 8 intends to:

   a. continue to share information and experience, which can help to broaden perspectives within the respective screening systems, including through practical exercises and case studies, involving thematic experts;
   
   b. start developing a holistic view of the security risks related to specific sensitive technologies and the policy tools addressing them, including in particular export controls and investment screening;
   
   c. continue conducting joint virtual outreach events for stakeholders as appropriate; and
   
   d. explore conducting a practical “tabletop” exercise in the later part of 2022 to continue to facilitate the exchange of best practices on a more technical and practical level.
Conclusions on Working Group 9 – Promoting SME Access to and Use of Digital Tools

1. As identified by the United States and the European Union during the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (“TTC”) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 29 September 2021, the use of digital tools is a key enabler for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (“SMEs”) to innovate, grow and compete. According to the TTC Inaugural Joint Statement, the uptake and use of these tools, however, varies significantly across sectors and regions, and SMEs - especially those in underserved communities – face challenges regarding access to technologies, data, and finance. We are therefore committed to ensuring access to digital tools and technologies for SMEs in both the United States and the European Union.

2. Since September, the members of the TTC Working Group 9, Promoting SME Access to and Use of Digital Tools, decided to undertake a joint work program on 15 October 2021, to carry out the scope of work requested of the Working Group as found in the TTC Inaugural Joint Statement. That joint work program includes outreach activities, such as roundtables and listening sessions with SMEs to ensure a better understanding of the barriers to their digital empowerment; webinars focused on areas of need for SMEs; best practice guides for SMEs; and SME-to-SME related programming. The results of which, including the Working Group’s engagements with SMEs and in view of existing governmental programs for SMEs, are all designed to inform the development of recommendations for U.S. and EU policymakers to implement that will help to accelerate access to and the uptake of digital tools by SMEs.

3. Pursuant to the 15 October 2021 joint work plan, and in addition to a number of roundtables and focus groups that have taken place in the United States and the European Union, the Working Group has already accomplished the following deliverables:

   a. A 25 January 2022, EU-led webinar on Cybersecurity for SMEs, which included specialized cybersecurity trainers and an opportunity for SMEs to share their experiences on cybersecurity issues.

   b. A 8 March 2022, U.S.-led webinar on SME Digital Skills and Developing Strategies for Companies, which focused on areas of need for SMEs to expand their ability to innovate and do business with the adoption of digital tools.

   c. The release of Cybersecurity Tips for SMEs, a best practice guide with the lessons of the 25 January 2022, webinar with resources for how SMEs can become more cyber-secure. This best practice guide can be found online.

   d. The launch of a study by the U.S. Small Business Administration on strengthening the use of digital tools by SMEs in the United States, to be completed by fall 2022.

4. The Working Group looks forward to continuing to support SMEs and their uptake and use of digital tools through additional programming following the 15-16 May 2022
meeting in Paris-Saclay, including with additional outreach activities, webinars, and the completion of the above-mentioned study.
Annex X

Conclusions on Working Group 10 – Global Trade Challenges

1. Building on Annex V to the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council ("TTC") Inaugural Joint Statement issued in Pittsburgh on 29 September 2022, the U.S. and EU leads of the TTC Global Trade Challenges Working Group have decided on the following initiatives.

Avoiding Unnecessary Trade Barriers

2. Recognizing each side’s regulatory autonomy and different legal systems, the United States and the European Union seek to strengthen bilateral trade and reduce the likelihood that regulations or other measures developed by either party generate unnecessary trade barriers for products or services derived from new and emerging technologies through enhanced information exchange and concrete trade facilitating initiatives, as follows:

Pre-Empting Trade Barriers

Bilateral information exchange

3. Without duplicating discussions under existing channels, such as in the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the United States and the European Union intend to offer each other, upon request, the opportunity to discuss regulatory initiatives and measures in new or emerging technology sectors that could have an impact on transatlantic trade, with the aim of maximizing opportunities for common approaches and avoiding, where possible, unnecessary barriers to trade. This opportunity will be part of the work and discussions under the Working Group on Global Trade Challenges.

Cooperation on shared trade concerns

4. The United States and the European Union intend to establish a trade coordination dialogue to exchange information at an early stage on initiatives or measures of third countries that either side believes constitute or could evolve into a significant trade barrier for U.S. and EU businesses. This dialogue will complement existing forms of coordination, both formal and informal, to ensure the opportunity for timely exchanges and cooperation on the full range of trade policies and disciplines.

Specific Trade Facilitating Initiatives

5. The United States and the European Union intend to work together to reduce the likelihood that regulations developed by either party generate unnecessary trade barriers for new and emerging technologies. For this purpose, we intend to cooperate to develop concrete, sectoral trade facilitating initiatives in selected sectors. With a view to reach progress before the next TTC meeting, we expect to:

a. Explore possibilities for facilitating trade through digital tools, including digital submissions for regulatory approvals and conformity assessments, where appropriate.
b. Identify specific areas or products, including those identified by industry stakeholders, where strengthened cooperation on conformity assessment could facilitate transatlantic trade.

6. The United States and the European Union will further seek to facilitate trade through increased cooperation in the area of government procurement. We share the objectives of building resilient transatlantic supply chains and of advancing climate and technology leadership. In the current geopolitical upheaval, we are committed to making our energy and high-tech supplies shock-proof by building up strong alliances as well as using technology to upgrade capacities. For this purpose, we intend to expand our cooperation in the area of government procurement.

7. The United States and the European Union will also seek to identify measures that will expand trade with and investment in Ukraine, as a means of mitigating the serious economic effects of the devastation caused by Russia’s military aggression.

8. Where possible and without prejudice to each side’s regulatory autonomy, the United States and the European Union will seek to avoid unintended consequences of domestic requirements that could create unnecessary barriers to trade and investment, notably for critical products/areas, in particular in relation to the environmental, health, digital and other high-tech sectors.

Trade Policy Cooperation on Non-Market policies and practices

Mutual Support and Coordination of Domestic Tools

9. Following up on the work plan to address non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices in Annex V of the TTC Inaugural Joint Statement, the United States and EU have:

a. Discussed specific non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices that threaten the livelihoods of U.S. and EU citizens and harm our workers and businesses, exchanged assessments of the impact of these policies and practices, and affirmed our commitment to enhance cooperation to effectively deter and address these shared concerns.

b. Exchanged inventories of existing U.S. and EU policy tools that can be deployed to address these harmful non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices.

Transatlantic Coordination of Effort

10. The United States and the European Union intend, where possible, to consult or coordinate with each other when using domestic tools to address non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices.

11. The United States and the European Union plan to develop joint or coordinated strategies, using available policies and tools, aimed at countering the harmful impact of non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices on technological development and competitiveness in sectors of shared priority, such as medical devices. Additional sectors may be prioritized in the future. We also plan to identify shared concerns relating to the use of government-owned, or-controlled investment funds, as well as tools that could be deployed to address them.
12. The United States and the European Union intend to consider whether to pursue similar discussions and analyses with like-minded trading partners.

**Avoiding Unintended Consequences**

13. When using domestic tools to address non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices, the United States and the European Union will seek to consult or coordinate with each other, with a view to avoiding or mitigating unintended consequences for each other, where possible.

**Trade and Labor**

14. The United States and the European Union intend to collaborate on the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights in global supply chains, including eradicating forced labor and child labor and addressing other labor rights violations. In pursuit of this, the United States and European Union intend to strengthen the contribution of transatlantic stakeholders, including transatlantic social partners (representatives of trade unions and businesses), to U.S. and EU trade policymaking.

**Priority Areas of Cooperation**

15. To advance the goals set out in the Pittsburgh Statement, the United States and the European Union plan to cooperate in the following priority areas:

   a. **Promoting responsible business conduct**, including by advancing respect for internationally recognized labor rights in global supply chains. In pursuit of this objective, the United States and the European Union intend to regularly:

      i. Exchange information on the development and implementation of due diligence and responsible business conduct, including on eradicating forced labor and child labor and on addressing other labor rights violations in global supply chains.

      ii. Identify opportunities for coordinating in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), International Labour Organization (“ILO”), United Nations, G7, G20, WTO, and other multilateral organizations on actions to advance responsible business conduct, including the eradication of forced labor in global supply chains. An opportunity for joint action could occur around the release of ILO’s new global forced labor estimate. Additional cooperation in the OECD and ILO could include enhancing increased uptake and effective application of due diligence guidance, including by developing practical tools for business to implement relevant international guidelines, and by strengthening the operation of the network of National Contact Points in the OECD.

      iii. Convene a roundtable focusing on tools and practical approaches on due diligence, including eradicating forced labor from supply chains. Participants will include stakeholders from trade unions, businesses, and other governments.

   b. **Increasing effectiveness of trade and labor engagements**, including by building the capacity of producing countries to implement high labor standards. For this purpose,
the United States and the European Union intend to share information and experiences on:

i. Trade and labor implementation and enforcement.

ii. Best practices in combatting forced labor.

iii. Best practices for utilizing trade engagement to promote the creation of socially responsible operations and sourcing, including an assessment of trade tools that have led to improvements in international labour standards.

c. The United States and the European Union intend to explore possible joint technical cooperation and funding in support of these trade and labor engagements, such as promoting improvements in labor conditions in a high-risk supply chain.

**Trade and Labor Dialogue with Social Partner Stakeholders**

16. The United States and European Union intend jointly to consult relevant stakeholders on transatlantic trade and labor issues, especially in relation to the work of the Working Group on Global Trade Challenges. In this regard, the United States and the European Union recognize the value of involving transatlantic social partners in the work of the TTC, with a focus on ways to help workers and employers make successful digital and green transitions, remain globally competitive, and enjoy broad and inclusive prosperity.

17. To this end, the United States and the European Union announce the establishment of a tripartite trade and labor dialogue (“TALD”), involving relevant representatives of the U.S. Government, the European Commission, and U.S. and EU trade unions and businesses, which will hold its first meeting during the summer. We expect to convene the TALD at least annually at the ministerial level, during one of the biannual TTC meetings. Tripartite technical level discussions on priority agenda items should be organized, as appropriate, throughout the year.

18. Issues on which the United States and the European Union will seek input from social partners include:

a. A just transition towards a sustainable, resilient, green economy.

b. Shaping and mitigating the impacts of digital trade on the U.S. and EU workforces, including, for example, in the areas of worker protections and the status of workers in the digital economy.

c. Addressing the social and economic implications for Ukrainian, U.S. and EU workers and businesses from Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

d. Other topics agreed by the governments and social partners.

**Trade and Environment/Climate**
19. The United States and the European Union share high ambitions to combat the climate crisis and protect the environment. We reiterate the positive role that trade can play in addressing environmental challenges such as tackling climate change, achieving climate neutrality, conserving biodiversity, supporting the transition to a more circular economy and preventing environmental degradation, including pollution. We wish to take a leading role in using trade policy and tools to support climate and environmental policy goals, and we will strive to improve mutual understanding of potential trade implications of each other’s climate and environmental measures. For this purpose, we intend to:

a. Cooperate and jointly support work in international fora to promote a stronger alignment on trade and climate/environmental matters in an inclusive manner. This should include cooperation on the implementation of the WTO statement on the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions including:

i. fostering better understanding of the role of trade in facilitating dissemination of goods and services to meet environmental and climate goals, with a focus on climate change mitigation and building climate resilience.

ii. enabling circular approaches, including a trade facilitative approach to remanufacturing, refurbishment, repair and direct reuse.

b. Exchange information on the implementation of environment-related provisions in our respective trade agreements.

c. Subject to applicable national laws and regulations, exchange information on our respective rules, actions and initiatives in relation to sustainable fisheries management and combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, including the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy regulations and implementation and the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act, with a view to enhancing common objectives on ensuring sustainably and legally harvested fish and fish products in our respective markets.

20. The United States and the European Union intend to discuss potential coordinated or joint responses to economic coercion affecting trade or investment that is experienced by the United States and the European Union and our trading partners and allies.

21. Russian aggression in Ukraine has increased food insecurity for millions of people by disrupting trade in key agricultural commodities and inputs such as fertilizers. World food prices reached their highest levels ever in March of this year, and there is now economic instability for agricultural exporters, producers, and consumers in the United States, the European Union, and around the world. These developments are compounding pressures on the agricultural sector arising from climate change and supply chain disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States and the European Union, as major agricultural producers and trading economies, agree on the importance of trade for food security around the world and have a shared interest in sustaining global agricultural production and trade.
22. To address these issues, the United States and European Union intend to launch a dialogue aimed at promoting more diversified trade in agricultural commodities and inputs and addressing over-reliance on certain trading partners, with the goal of increasing the resilience of global food production. Through this dialogue, which will be carried out under the TTC in close cooperation with the USDA/AGRI Collaborative Platform on Agriculture (“CPA”), the United States and the European Union will seek to identify discrete areas of cooperation aimed at strengthening the resilience of global food production through trade in agricultural commodities and inputs.