Aboard Air Force One
En Route Rzeszów, Poland

1:23 P.M. CET

MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Hello.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Hey, guys.  Hello.  How are you?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Hello.  We have Jake Sullivan here.  He’s going to talk a little bit about the President’s trip to Poland and our announcement today — our energy announcement — and then also take some Q&A.  And then I’ll follow up with any other questions you might have. 

Go ahead, Jake.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Thanks.  So, of course, you guys heard from the President and President von der Leyen earlier today on a new U.S.-EU energy framework that accomplishes two basic purposes: one, to help the EU reduce its dependence on Russian gas; and then two, to help it reduce its dependence on gas overall.  And as part of that, we’re committing to make available up to 15 billion cubic meters additional LNG this year through a variety of different means. 

And then the Europeans will be working on building out their infrastructure to be able to accept up to 50 billion cubic meters — between now and 2030, per year — additional LNG flows from the United States. 

The basic notion here is that while we’re making this clean energy transition and putting in place all of the tools and infrastructure necessary to have an economy powered by clean and renewable energy, while gas is still a substantial part of the energy mix, we want to make sure that the Europeans do not have to source that gas from Russia. 

And so, we’ll get to work immediately on that in 2022, and then we’ll build year by year between now and 2030, even as we make the far-reaching investments necessary for the clean energy transition. 

There’ll be a joint task force established between the White House and the presidency of the European Commission to implement this basic approach. 

And then, of course, they also spoke about an agreement on an updated framework for transatlantic data flows to ensure data privacy and security, and to protect those flows which form the foundation of a $7.1 trillion economic relationship between the U.S. and the EU. 

And this agreement in principle that was reached today really puts us in a position to ensure that American technology firms — big firms, yes, but especially small- and medium-sized firms — will be protected as we go forward and can fully and safely operate within the context of the U.S.-EU economic — transatlantic economic relationship.

So that’s what we did this morning. 

Now, we’re off to Rzeszów, Poland.

Q    Rzeszów.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Say it again.

Q    Rzeszów.  I just spent three weeks there.  (Laughter.)

MR. SULLIVAN:  Rzeszów, Poland — thank you — where the President will have the opportunity to meet with his Administrator of the USAID, Samantha Power, and a range of different humanitarian experts and leaders who will give him a briefing on the humanitarian assistance efforts both into and around Ukraine. 

Yesterday, the President announced that the United States is committed to provide an additional billion dollars in humanitarian assistance to help the people of Ukraine — those who are still inside the country and those who have been displaced by the conflict.  And he will be able to talk through with a range of different humanitarian leaders and experts, both from the region and from the international community, as well as the U.S. government experts who are playing a key role in this — how the efforts are going so far and what further steps need to be taken to make sure that we’re investing those dollars as wisely as possible.

He will also have the chance to visit with troops from the 82nd Airborne Division, who have been deployed to Poland to reassure our NATO Ally and to deter further aggression on the eastern flank.  And he will also get a briefing from the commanders of those units who will have the chance to lay out for him the various tasks and missions that the American troops stationed at the airfield here have been undertaking and continue to undertake.

We have 10,500 troops in Poland as part of 100,000 strong U.S. force contingent across the continent as a whole.  And a significant number of those forces here in Poland were FLOT forward — brigade combat team, tactical aviation, a Stryker unit — to ensure that we have robust deterrence and assurance in the face of Russian aggression and to fulfill the President’s commitment that we’ll defend every inch of NATO territory. 

We’ll go on from Rzeszów to Warsaw.  And tomorrow, the President will meet with President Duda of Poland.  He will also have the opportunity to meet with Ukrainian refugees and with American humanitarians who are there trying to help feed and respond to the material needs of the refugee population in Warsaw. 

And he will give a major address tomorrow that will speak to the stakes of this moment, the urgency of the challenge that lies ahead, what the conflict in Ukraine means for the world, and why it is so important that the free world sustain unity and resolve in the face of Russian aggression.  He’ll also talk about the context and history of this conflict and where he sees it going from here. 

So that will be a significant speech that he delivers tomorrow afternoon, before we get on the plane to come home. 

And I think that covers the waterfront for now, although I reserve the right to revise and extend my remarks as necessary.  (Laughter.)

Q    Jake, President Zelenskyy said he thinks Russia wants to invade other Eastern European countries.  Is that an assessment that the administration shares — that other countries in Eastern Europe are at risk?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So we do believe that Russian aggression in Ukraine shows a willingness by the Russians to disregard international borders and to disregard the basic rules of the road of the international community that have been built and sustained over the course of seven decades.

So the President has been very explicit that part of the reason he’s sent forces forward to the Baltic states, to Poland, to Romania and he’s supported the setup of these four battle groups in the southern countries of NATO’s eastern flank is because it is important in this moment to send a clear message to Russia that the United States and NATO will defend every inch of NATO territory, and to deter any thinking that Putin might have about further Russian aggression into NATO.

In addition, the fact that Russian forces have mobilized in Belarus and that Belarus has changed its constitution to allow for more flexibility of the stationing of Russian troops and capabilities on its soil, that too has a significant impact, particularly on our NATO Allies in the Baltics and in Poland.

And so the combination of Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine and the change in the physical military relationship between Russia and Belarus does mean, from the President’s perspective, that the United States and NATO need to show strength and resolve in terms of the forces and capabilities postured along the eastern flank.

And you will see that in living color at this stop today.

Q    Jake, President Biden, at the press conference yesterday, said that if Russia uses chemical weapons in Ukraine, the United States and NATO will respond in kind, which would seem to imply using chemical weapons back.  Is that what he meant by “in kind”?  Or what was he trying to say there?

MS. SULLIVAN:  No.  No.  And you heard him in another answer say we’ll respond accordingly — meaning, you know, we will select the form and nature of our response based on the nature of the action Russia takes, and we’ll do so in coordination with our Allies.  And we’ve communicated to the Russians, as the President said publicly a couple of weeks ago, that there will be a severe price if Russia uses chemical weapons.

And I won’t go beyond that other than to say the United States has no intention of using chemical weapons, period, under any circumstances.

Q    And just briefly following —

Q    Following up on that — on nuclear weapons: With Russia threatening to use nuclear weapons, does the President consider that a red line?  And how would the U.S. respond?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, again, I will just say, with respect to any use of weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical, biological — Russia would pay a severe price for the use of those weapons, as the President has previously said.  We have spoken to our Allies.  We have done contingency planning within our own government.  And we have communicated directly to the Russians.  And I’m not going to speak further to it here.

Q    On off-ramp for Putin here, was there a consensus — a consensus of what that may look like, what strategies to get him there?  Anything you can say about those particular discussions?

MR. SULLIVAN:  From my perspective, “off-ramp” is the wrong concept — because, of course, this was a war Putin chose to wage; it’s a war Putin could choose to stop.  At any moment, he could pull his forces back, he could end the bombardment of cities and civilians.

Now, there is a diplomatic process underway.  That process is being conducted directly between the Ukrainians and the Russians.  And you have some communication between European allies, like France and Germany, as well as partners like Israel, directly with the Russians. 

The United States is not directly participating in those negotiations, but we’re staying in close contact with our Ukrainian counterparts and with those other countries that are talking to both sides.

The President was very clear yesterday that, ultimately, any diplomatic agreement is one that Ukraine itself will have to determine for itself, and the United States is not going to push or pressure Ukraine into any particular outcome.

The last thing I would say is that, from our perspective, our role right now is to ensure that as long as Putin keeps pushing forward, that Ukraine has tools and capabilities to be able to effectively defend itself.  That’s where our focus is.

Q    Jake, on the liquid natural gas, on the 15 billion cubic centimeter — or cubic meters, excuse me — that are supposed to go this year, how much of that supply is already secured or needs to be secured?  And how much of that would be coming from the U.S. versus other countries?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, I’m not sure exactly what you mean by “already secured” versus “needs to be secured,” because this will play out over the course of the year.  So there haven’t been contracts signed for every one of those, if that’s what you mean by “secured.”

But we believe that we’ve identified the sources to be able to hit that target.  And it’s a combination of what the U.S. can do directly.  For example, on March 16th, we approved the expansion of the number of countries that could receive gas from some of our terminals, number one. 

Number two, we have already, over the course of the past couple of months, effectively engaged in a cargo diversion strategy to move cargo that’s destined for other countries to go to Europe.  And we will be able to continue that over the course of the year.

And then, number three, the President himself has personally engaged with some other gas suppliers, including Qatar, who have been able to step up.

So, when you put all of those pieces together, we feel quite confident that we’ll hit our mark.

Q    And then, on the G20, really quickly.  On the G20 —

Q    Jake, (inaudible) what your response would be?  To Ashley’s question, you said you didn’t want to say what the response would be.  It would — you know, you’d respond.  But was there a consensus among allies at the meetings this week as to what the response would be just among yourselves?  Did you guys decide what that would be if Russia used chemical and biological weapons?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, I would say this was a important topic of conversation at the summit, and it continues at working levels in the military, on the diplomatic side, and among the presidents’ and prime ministers’ offices.  We are working through contingency planning for a range of different scenarios.

It is difficult to give precision to these kinds of hypotheticals because, of course, the form of use, the location of use, the context of use all have a bearing on the specificity of the response.

But in broad terms, I believe that there is convergence around the fundamental nature of how the Alliance would respond to these issues.

Q    And just a response to the latest statement from Ukraine that the bombing of the theater in Mariupol killed hundreds of civilians.

MR. SULLIVAN:  We all have a very deeply human response to what happened in the bombing of that theater, which is just absolute shock and horror, particularly given the fact that it was so clearly a civilian target that the Russians were striking and that they did so with such brazen disregard for the lives of innocent people. 

In terms of a more formal response or analysis of the specific number, we’ve just seen that statement, and we’re in touch with Ukrainians, but I don’t have anything further to add.

Q    Jake, in the past, you guys have said that, you know, a cyberattack on border countries from Russia — NATO Allies would have to figure out if that counts — if that invokes Article 5.  Was there discussion of that yesterday?  And was there any sort of decision made on that front?

MR. SULLIVAN:  There has been no invocation of Article 5 at this point.  You know, if a country suffers a cyberattack and calls for a collective response from the Alliance — and I hasten to note: The invocation of Article 5 and the application of a collective response doesn’t necessarily have to be a military response; it could take a number of forms, including helping that country remediate the problem, helping them build resilience against ongoing attacks, or taking a variety of cost-imposition measures against the attacker. 

But ultimately, it comes down to the country under attack, probably first invoking Article 4 — consultations to discuss the collective response — and then making a determination as to whether to invoke Article 5, to ask the Alliance to come together to respond as one.  That has not happened yet. 

Q    President Biden said yesterday that Putin should be kicked out of the G20 — or Russia, more specifically.  What efforts are underway to make that a reality?  Is that possible?

And there was also mention that their economy, based on the sanctions, are now below that threshold anyway.  So, what is the implication of that determination on their G20 status?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, the President very clearly expressed his view that, you know, Russia should not be a member in good standing of the G20, given what they’ve done.  He also noted that Indonesia, as the chair, may have a different view.  And he offered an alternative, which was having Ukraine be able to participate in the G20 meetings this year. 

So, we will be discussing with the other G20 members, including Indonesia.  And the President was clear in his remarks that we want to be respectful of the views of the chair in terms of how to think about us going forward.  So we’ll be talking to them.  We’ll be talking to other partners. 

And I’ll just leave it at what the President said yesterday, which I thought was quite clear, straightforward, and, frankly, logical: that at this moment in time, it just can’t be business as usual with Russia in the G20. 

Q    On China, what — on China, what was agreed to among the Allies about, like, what the message should be to them and how you’re going to coordinate that?  And what’s the administration’s view at this moment of how — of whether they’re leaning toward aiding the Russians at this point?  Or have they — are you seeing signs that they’re backing away from doing so?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, I would refer you — I rarely get to just cite paragraphs in NATO communiqués, but I would refer you to paragraph eight in the NATO statement out yesterday.  And I do so because it was an unusual — an unusually direct statement, message to China from the Alliance, stating what the Allies agreed in the room, which is, collectively, we’re going to speak with one voice in saying to China that they should not provide military or other forms of assistance to Russia in the prosecution of its brutal war in Ukraine.  And all of the Allies agreed to carry that message individually, as well as speaking collectively on it. 

The President also had the opportunity to coordinate with both President Michel and President von der Leyen of the European Union in advance of their April 1st summit, and to talk to the 27 at the EU on this topic.  And there was broad agreement about sending that very clear message to Beijing about the implications and consequences of such support.  I think we’re all on the same page, and you’ll see that play out.

On the question of what we’re seeing: It remains true today what I told you two days ago, which is that since the President’s call with Xi Jinping, since my meeting with Yang Jiechi in Rome, we have not seen the Chinese move forward with the provision of military equipment to Russia.  But it’s something we continue to watch every day. 

Q    Jake, back on chemical weapons briefly: I’m not asking for a specific, but throughout this invasion, the U.S. has been very clear that we would not want to — or that you guys would not want to take steps that would be viewed as a direct escalation or confrontation with Russia.  If Russia were to use chemical weapons, would that general view and philosophy change?  Would the U.S. be more willing to get into a direct military confrontation with Russia?

MR. SULLIVAN:  I think that is an excellent effort at getting me to say something substantially different on this question than I’ve said so far. 

But, really, the key point here is that we’ve had the opportunity to speak directly to the Russians about the use of chemical weapons — the potential use of chemical weapons.  We’ve had the opportunity to coordinate with our Allies.  We’ve had the opportunity to get organized internally.  We’ve been clear publicly that Russia would pay a severe price.  And beyond that, I’m not going to speak further to the issue. 

It is something that, right after the conflict began, I personally tasked the stand-up of a new tiger team that would look at a range of contingencies — this being a prominent one of those contingencies. 

And so, we feel like we have made considerable efforts to put ourselves in a position to respond effectively.  But I’m not going to preview the nature of that response.

Q    A question about the escalation of responses.  When — you know, is the administration concerned that they’re running out of sanctions that they could put on Russia that would still have a significant impact?  You know, the U.S. has already done so much in the way of sanctions.  Are there other ways to go up the escalatory ladder besides military conflict that the U.S. still has? 

Q    And actually, to follow up on that, is there any concern that these sanctions and these tough measures could have the opposite intended — intention and backfire, and cause the population to actually, you know, get behind Putin if they feel that they’re being put upon by the U.S. and the EU and NATO?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Certainly the Russian leadership is going to aggressively make the case to their public that, you know, the poor, innocent government of Russia has just been economically attacked by the West, and they will use their very considerable propaganda machine to push that line. 

But at the end of the day, the Russian people are going to ask the more fundamental question of why this happened and how this happened.  And we believe that, at the end of the day, they will be able to connect the dots.  And the same will be true up and down the Russian government: that this is — these are costs that President Putin has brought on himself and his country and his economy and his defense industrial base because of his completely unjustified and unprovoked decision to go to war in Ukraine. 

And we do think the sanctions will increasingly have the effect of pressuring and constraining the Russian economy, the Russian war machine in ways that will shape their thinking as they go forward.  And that will undermine their capacity to play an aggressive role in the world, as they have done over the course of the past many years. 

In terms of additional steps that we can take, we believe that, of course, there are additional measures to tighten the screws on sanctions, and we will be constantly reviewing those.

This point about enforcement, though, I think is really central.  Because in the period ahead, Russia’s main focus, from an economic perspective, is going to be to figure out how they can get around, over, or under the sanctions that have been imposed.  And blocking off those pathways is going to be vital to producing the kinds of cost-imposition effects and vital to shaping the thinking in the Kremlin.  So that’s really going to be our focus in the near term. 

But, yes, we believe that we still retain the capacity to impose additional costs on Russia that are not strictly military costs.

Q    Can you speak to the timing of the North Korean missile launch?  The President obviously was here overseas making the case.  Any evidence to suggest the timing was not coincidental?

MR. SULLIVAN:  You know, we —

Q    (Inaudible) believe otherwise?

MR. SULLIVAN:  We took the somewhat unusual step of putting out a statement several days ago from the Biden administration describing these two earlier tests — I believe one was on February 28th, and the other was on March 4th, although I might have those dates slightly off — as being testing the capabilities of an ICBM, which North Korea itself did not advertise but our intelligence community determined and then we declassified that information. 

In that statement, we warned that there would be more ICBM tests, and that’s what happened here. 

We see this as part of a pattern of testing and provocation from North Korea that is — has played out over the course of the past months and will continue to play out.  We think there is likely more in store, and we don’t see any particular indication that this test went on this day for this reason. 

Indeed, some of what is, you know, maybe driving the tempo of the testing relates to the badly failed tests that occurred just a few days ago.  But most of the decision-making on their nuclear and testing program occurs within the context of the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean view of its security situation, not what’s happening with President Biden’s travel schedule.

Q    Jake on the Iran deal, now that it seems to be on its back, what can the U.S. do and what will the U.S. do to make sure that Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon and to get Russia on board with that program? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, I wouldn’t accept the characterization “on its back.”  I would say that we have made substantial progress in resolving a significant number of the issues that would be necessary for us to come back into the deal on a compliance-for-compliance basis.  There still are issues left.  There still is work to be done.  But we are still seeking a diplomatic outcome here that puts Iran’s nuclear program back in a box. 

Of course, if diplomacy doesn’t succeed, then we will work very closely with our international partners to increase the pressure on Iran. 

And I would just point out that the difference between the Biden administration’s approach on Iran policy and the previous administration’s approach on Iran policy is that we do have the capacity to marshal and muster the support of key allies, particularly in Europe, that were divided from the United States on the Iran issue throughout the previous administration.

Q    On the sanctions, you spoke about the importance of enforcing them.  How much are secondary sanctions going to play into that?  And, I guess, is the administration preparing to issue secondary sanctions on third parties who might be violating the ones already in place?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So we have a number of tools to ensure compliance, and one of those tools is the designation of individuals or entities in third-party jurisdictions who are not complying with U.S. sanctions or who are undertaking

systematic efforts to weaken or evade them.  And those tools are, at this point, well understood by companies and countries around the world.  And we won’t — you know, we’re prepared to use them if it becomes necessary to do so. 

Q    Do you expect the peacekeeping proposal to be part of the discussions with President Duda?  And after yesterday’s discussions, is there any openness to it from the President’s side?

MR. SULLIVAN:  There was not any kind of detailed discussion of that proposal yesterday.  I don’t know, candidly, whether President Duda will raise it.  If he does, the President will listen to him.  But we still are seeking to understand greater details about what exactly they have in mind, because we don’t have great clarity on that.  And until we get those details, there’s not much more I can add.

Q    What’s going on with the jets?  What’s the update with the jets?  Are the jets coming?  Is there a plan for the jets?  Is that plan dead in the water?  Was that part of negotiations this week — getting jets into Ukraine in some form?

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’ve got no update on the jets for you today.  Nothing has fundamentally changed from our perspective since I think maybe you or one of the rest of you asked that question two days ago.  I’ll leave it at that for now. 

Q    Any update on the anti-air systems like the S-300?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Only that the United States is working actively with allies in Europe and partners even further afield to get sophisticated anti-air capabilities to the Ukrainians.

I’m not going to speak about specific countries or specific systems because that work is underway and, of course, I want to protect the efficiency and effectiveness of that work to actually get those systems where they need to be.

Q    Speaking of President Zelenskyy’s demands, he made some specific demands for tanks, for anti-ship missiles.  What was your official answer to him?

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, we are in conversation with the Ukrainians and with our allies about coastal defense and anti- ship capabilities that we could provide.  There are some operational complexities associated with that, but that is a vector, an area where we are trying to make rapid progress.

The — we heard his request for tanks, among other things. He has not — the Ukrainians have not yet specifically come to the United State, as far as I understand, on the tanks issue; they’ve gone to some other countries.

So, you know, we’ll stay in consultation with them on all of these different kinds of systems and try to make a determination about what we can source, what’s going to be effective, and what the cost-benefit analysis of the supply of any given system is.

Q    Some of these weapons are supplied overland through NATO countries.  Is the administration concerned that Russia would try to bomb these convoys before they enter Ukraine — in a NATO country? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  We are doing contingency planning for the possibility that Russia chooses to strike NATO territory in that context or in any other context.  And the President has been about as clear as one can be about his absolute determination to respond decisively alongside the other members of our Alliance if Russia attacks NATO.

Q    Jake, can you share any behind-the-scenes color, details of what the President is doing, how he is preparing for the address you mentioned on Saturday, even what he’s eating? Just anything a little inter- — like a little —

MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  (Inaudible.)

Q    Yeah.  But, I mean, interesting color.  This has all been fascinating, but specifically in a color way.

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’m so bad at that because I, like, only — they — I get out of my hermetically sealed container to execute on the policy issues and then get back in, and I’m not sure what people eat or drink.

Q    But, like, has he been writing out the speech long?

MR. SULLIVAN:  No, so — so, let’s see.  I mean, look, first, I would just say President Biden — and you can see this; you could see it in the press conference yesterday — he just believes passionately in NATO, in the transatlantic relationship. 

At the end of his remarks yesterday to the European Union, after some back-and-forth, he gave just a — there’s no other word for it than impassioned statement about the depth of his personal conviction for the transatlantic alliance and the transatlantic community, and the — both its past, its present, and its future.

And so I would say he sleeps way less on these kinds of trips than maybe other trips because he’s just going, going, going — like, wants to talk to the next leader; you know, take the next briefing. 

And also, we’ve been covering this incredibly broad range of stuff.  Right?  So he was monitoring the negotiations on closing out Privacy Shield at the same time that he was working through the details of how many billion cubic meters we’re committing this year, at the same time as we’re talking about coastal defense capabilities to Ukraine, at the same time that we’re dealing with food security and wheat prices.

So, on this trip, it’s been a kind of remarkable mix of having a bunch of subject-matter experts further up in the cabin here doing, like, speed dating with the President on, you know, every topic under the sun. 

And I don’t mean to, like, denigrate the substance of it by calling it “speed dating,” but you get the — you get the image — like, working through all these different things.  And he — think he’s probably taken every meal he’s eaten so far here over a briefing.  Right?  Like, he’s not sitting alone eating; he’s eating while someone is going through some element of this trip with him.

So that’s the best I can do for color today.  (Laughter.) But I will try to improve upon it in the future.  How about that?  Okay.

Q    (Inaudible) a lot of political issues.  You know, the President’s approval ratings have taken a dive.  There’s challenge with preserving democracy at home.  Is the administration concerned that some of these things are undermining his ability to work with allies on these issues and, you know, marshaling support if people are concerned about the political backing that he has domestically?

MR. SULLIVAN:  You know, it’s interesting: We have not seen that at all.  And, of course, I would say that in any event, but I actually really mean it today.  (Laughter.)

They’re just — this — the fact that the President a week ago could say, “Let’s get the 30 Allies together.  Let me go sit with the 27 leaders of the European Union.  Let’s get the G7, including Prime Minister Kishida coming over from Tokyo.  Let’s all get in one set of rooms on one day and have this out, and have everyone there energized, listening first and foremost to the President, and then rallying together” — the story of the unity on this throughout has been a story of the President’s personal leadership, of American leadership, and of the deep credibility that he has with these leaders.  And that has been, from my perspective, unqualified. 

I would just make one comment that the President said yesterday that I think is really important for you all to think about as we go forward, which is: Part of the reason that he decided that we needed to do this is because, the early weeks, unity can be carried forward by momentum and inertia and adrenaline, but this could go on for quite some time.  And to sustain that unity as costs rise, as the tragedy unfolds, that’s hard work.  And the President wanted to get everyone together to say, “We’ve got to do that work.” 

So I’m not saying that the unity has been built and it’ll just be there for good.  But the rate limiter on that unity is not anything to do with the President’s, you know, domestic circumstances.  The rate limiter is just: This is a tough situation, and it takes an American President coming over to really try to drive this forward to keep the ball rolling and keep us all very tightly aligned and united.

So, I’ll —

Q    (Inaudible) on oil prices.

Q    Jake, I think you may need to run.

MR. SULLIVAN:  Last question.

Q    The last.  There was a strate- — a lot of coordination among allies on oil — strategic releases, things like that.  Did those ideas come back up again?  And should we expect some action on that?

MR. SULLIVAN:  Yes, they came back up.  They came back up in particularly the G7 meeting.  That was a major topic of conversation.  The question of what tools we have at our disposal to deal with global oil prices.

And without getting ahead of the administration, we are looking at various actions we could take.  And I’ll leave it at that for now.  But this was not just about talking, it was about thinking about the steps we can take in the period ahead.  But I will not steal the thunder of the administration on that issue.

So, thank you, guys.  Appreciate (inaudible).

     MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Wow.  That was great.  All right, guys, hold on.  It’s getting super bumpy.

     Q   We’re landing in about five minutes.

     MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Oh, we’re at time?  Okay.  Oh, okay.  All right.  Well —

Q    I’m out of questions.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  Duncan, you’re out of questions?

     Q    Can we just ask you something just about the ceasefire in Ethiopia and how —

     MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  I just don’t have anything for you on that.  I’m happy to check with the team, but I don’t have anything specifically on the ceasefire in Ethiopia.  Clearly, that’s something that we’re monitoring.

     All right.

     Q    Thank you.

     MS. JEAN-PIERRE:  All right.  Thanks, guys.  See you on the ground.

     1:58 P.M. CET

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